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Today digital sources supply a historically unprecedented component of
human sensorimotor data, the consumption of which is correlated with
poorly understood maladies such as Internet addiction disorder and In-
ternet gaming disorder. Because both natural and digital sensorimotor
data share common mathematical descriptions, one can quantify our in-
formational sensorimotor needs using the signal processing metrics of
entropy, noise, dimensionality, continuity, latency, and bandwidth. Such
metrics describe in neutral terms the informational diet human brains re-
quire to self-calibrate, allowing individuals tomaintain trusting relation-
ships. With these metrics, we define the trust humans experience using
the mathematical language of computational models, that is, as a prim-
itive statistical algorithm processing finely grained sensorimotor data
from neuromechanical interaction. This definition of neuromechanical
trust implies that artificial sensorimotor inputs and interactions that at-
tract low-level attention through frequent discontinuities and enhanced
coherence will decalibrate a brain’s representation of its world over the
long term by violating the implicit statistical contract for which self-
calibration evolved.Our hypersimplifiedmathematical understanding of
human sensorimotor processing asmultiscale, continuous-time vibratory
interaction allows equally broad-brush descriptions of failuremodes and
solutions. For example, we model addiction in general as the result of
homeostatic regulation gone awry in novel environments (sign reversal)
and digital dependency as a sub-case in which the decalibration caused
by digital sensorimotor data spurs yet more consumption of them. We
predict that institutions can use these sensorimotor metrics to quantify
media richness to improve employee well-being; that dyads and family-
size groups will bond and heal best through low-latency, high-resolution
multisensory interaction such as shared meals and reciprocated touch;
and that individuals can improve sensory and sociosensory resolution
through deliberate sensory reintegration practices. We conclude that we
humans are the victims of our own success, our hands so skilled they
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fill the world with captivating things, our eyes so innocent they follow
eagerly.
1 Introduction
Thanks to advances in communications infrastructure and interactive digi-
tal technology, digital stimuli constitute an ever-growing portion of human
informational diets. Mobile digital devices, once niche products with lim-
ited versatility, are now ubiquitous workhorses and convenient sources of
entertainment. They are an integral part of lived experience for many peo-
ple around theworld, providingunprecedented access to digital sensorimo-
tor data and transforming our everyday understanding of what it means to
connect with other human beings.
“The Internet” and “technology” are often blamed for changes in social
norms and social expectations. Google is making us stupid. Our phones are
turning us into narcissists. Our games are desensitizing us. Might hysteri-
cal nostalgia be fueling concern over the rising prominence of the Internet
in our private and public lives? In some cases, yes. Nevertheless, a growing
body of scientific research is dedicated to understanding how the Internet
is changing individuals, groups, and culture more generally. In this body of
research, excessive time online has been consistently correlated with psy-
chosocial distress—namely, depression, loneliness, and anxiety. What ac-
counts for this link? (For summaries of work in the field, see Carbonell,
Guardiola, Fuster, Gil, & Tayana, 2016; Tokunaga & Rains, 2010, 2016; Cash,
Rae, Steel, & Winkler, 2012; Block, 2008; Young, 1999.)
Internet addiction, defined as an impulse control disorder much like
pathological gambling, was first proposed as a diagnosis for inclusion
in the DSM in 1996 by the psychologist Kimberly S. Young (1996). The
multidisciplinary field she created, though growing, still suffers from
methodological limitations and lacks stable answers.Most important,What
exactly is Internet “addiction”? A primary disorder of the reward system?
Amanifestation of an impulse control disorder?What mechanisms account
for its co-occurrence with loneliness, depression, and social anxiety? Does
Internet addiction evolve from psychosocial distress or vice versa? Are
some individuals more prone than others? How best to treat it? Unfortu-
nately, such methodological questions are compounded by dizzying multi-
plicities of variables—content, display, interactivity, incentives, users, ages,
countries—together making consistent, stable data hard to find and preva-
lence rates hard to measure with consistency. We know that excessive time
online is related to psychosocial distress, but we do not know why.
While researchers labor toward definitive answers, technology accel-
erates. Digital stimulus streams are becoming progressively easier to ac-
cess and will likely continue to load 21st-century informational diets. This
prospect raises two important research questions about the demands that
digital interactivity and digital sensorimotor data place on the human
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nervous system: Do our informational diets matter? How? The value of
these two questions lies precisely in their generality, because only a general
framework can span present and future technologies and cross disciplinary
boundaries.
The theoretical framework we introduce to explain how digital interac-
tivity affects the human nervous system suggests that the structure of a
human’s informational diet matters. We use the term informational diet to
denote the sensorimotor data a person consumes on a regular basis. We use
the term neuromechanical trust to denote the statistical ur-computations un-
derlying accurate world models. In our framework, sensorimotor data are
differentiated primarily by data format, bias, latency, and bandwidth. Thus,
we are not concerned with type of online activity (e.g., gaming, shopping,
surfing) or content (e.g., violent, educational, political). Instead, we distin-
guish between the continuous, fractal-like coherence of natural sensorimo-
tor data and interactivity versus the discontinuous, artificially enhanced co-
herence of digital data and interactivity. We wish to quantify both natural
data and interactivity and digital data and interactivity in common terms
relevant to the computations our brains perform.
This stripped-down version of “nature” and “the Internet” contributes
to the generality of our theoretical framework. It is a framework inspired
by three approaches well known elsewhere: (1) the theoretical physics
practice of employing reference frames that invite difficult problems to
surrender themselves to simple mathematical descriptions, (2) the hard-
ware/software practice of tightly specifying data formats and interface
protocols, and (3) the big data practice of projecting noisy, quantized, high-
dimensional data onto smooth, low-dimensional curves. In our approach,
the reference frame, the data format, and the smooth curves are all found
in the structure of three-dimensional space-time. Our principles are theo-
retical: mathematics, physics, data science, signal processing, and control
theory.
We use these assumptions to describe potential sensorimotor data in
terms of informational quantity (entropy), coherence enrichment (statis-
tical profile), and spatiotemporal qualities (latency) and to identify envi-
ronmental factors relevant to the global phenomenon known as Internet
addiction disorder. We also use these assumptions to model the human
brain as a homeostatically self-calibrating circuit, informational diets as
“calibration fields” containing various concentrations of noise and coher-
ence, and circuit/field interactions as processes of information foraging.
The homeostatic self-calibrationmodel we present here, though it was orig-
inally conceived of independently, now revises a well-known information
foraging model developed by Peter Pirolli and Stuart Card (1999), which
itself revised earlier animal foraging models (Charnov, 1976).
Since Barlow (1961), neuroscience has maintained that the general pur-
pose of the human perceptual system is to make accurate models of in-
coming signals (Hinton & Dayan, 1996). We understand these as predictive
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perceptual models. How exactly such models are produced remains an open
question, as readers of this journal well know. What remains beyond ques-
tion are two things: first, human perceptual models operate substantially
like those of our primate ancestors, and second, such operation obeys
mathematical constraints. Specifically, primate evolution established the
statistical environment in which brains operate, and the mathematics of
information flow and compression establishes how brains must use that in-
formation. These constraints are the terms of an implicit statistical contract
between brains and the natural world.
We model human brains simply, as primate brains. We model homeo-
static self-calibration even more simply, based on the foraging strategies of
bacteria or birds. We believe a simple model has the best chance of captur-
ing the general, low-level computational processes that underlie high-level
perception. Our circuit model’s simplicity means it should be regarded as a
minimal concept map, not a biorealistic model. With it, we confirm and ex-
plain a well-known sign-reversal dynamic—a failure mode of homeostatic
control systems known as homeostatic fragility, by which simple homeo-
static systems become irreversibly entrapped by particular statistical en-
vironments (Ramsay & Woods, 2014). We dub this sign-reversal dynamic
leading-indicator dependency.
The robustness of that particular entrapment cycle leads us to descrip-
tively predict, on theoretical grounds, that dysfunctional Internet use is a
maladaptive response to an informational diet high in coherence-enriched
stimuli (abundant on the Internet), one leading to problematic cognitions
that reinforce unconscious preferences for coherence-enriched stimuli. Left
unchecked, this feedback loopwill cause the human brain to lose trust in its
senses, its companions, and itself. This loss of trust is progressively related
to resolution loss in the brain’s perceptual model. We also predict that the
most efficient way tomaintain and restore resolution, and hence brain func-
tion, will involve systematic continuous sensory exposure: to live (rather
than recorded or synthesized), interactive (rather than broadcast), naturally
coherent (rather than coherence-enriched), and multisensory (rather than
monosensory) signal streams originating from three-dimensional space.
Such streams are easily found in nature and human companionship.
We discuss this framework’s possible role in guiding the digital technol-
ogy industry to design products that are sensitive to human sensory needs.
We also compare the framework’s predictions to existing research and sug-
gest future research directions. Finally, we discuss implications.
2 Our Theoretical Inspiration
We have reason to hope that a simple mathematical model can encom-
pass human informational appetites because an even simpler model has al-
ready done much more by locating cognitive forces in the ancient foraging
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dynamics of bacteria. In a theoretical tour de force, Hills (2006) locates
the principal axis of attention, and thus of human attentional disorders
like attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder,
and autism, as a single, simple information-theoretic trade-off pitting focus
against blur. Hills dissects the “area-restricted search” strategy by which
microorganisms like bacteria loiter near food sources and uses computer-
based genetic algorithms to illustrate the core one-dimensional strategy of
these or any foraging creature, regardless of the space in which it forages:
stay or go—that is, move slowly, if you find success (“stay”); move faster
the less you find (“go”). This seems to be the simplest and perhaps the only
way a creature could change its velocity to locate food in space: stay in place
and sharpen spatial focus to select for lower search-space entropy versus go
and blur spatial focus, like diffusion, to increase search entropy.
Theorists have acknowledged a related mathematical insight since Dar-
win: that the optimization performed by evolution and by genetic al-
gorithms such as Hill’s operate by alternating mutation/randomization/
diffusion (i.e., by increasing entropy) with selection or selective amplifi-
cation (i.e., reducing entropy). In alternating selection with diffusion, the
theories ofDarwin andHills, in theirmathematical essences shorn ofmolec-
ular and historical detail, describe how informational organisms modulate
entropy to optimize crucial variables. Darwin showed how animals evolve;
Hills shows how we move.
These foraging dynamics have a special appeal to the algorithmically
inclined: the sharpening information signal that bacteria pursue is author-
itative and unbiased, being created by real gradients in the physical world.
So although the forager’s present input controls how it finds future input,
that feedback loop passes through reality, so there is no danger of getting
stuck in a self-reinforcing state. But that guarantee no longer holds for more
complex creatures, for which information itself can be a resource.
Foraging for and storing information involve representation and antici-
pation (i.e., anticipating future resources in future places). As Hills (2006),
explains: “Where once we would expect the animal to perseverate in the
presence of the reward,wemaynowexpect the animal to perseverate on the
expectation (stimulated by external or internal cues) or ‘idea’ of the reward”
(p. 16). Anticipation in particular involves trading away certainty to receive
faster success, and thus more success, on average in the right statistical en-
vironment. But representation’s fundamental trade can be a devil’s bargain,
because the forager itself must now replace the real sharpness of physical
gradients with algorithmic sharpening, which requires selective amplifica-
tion. Unfortunately, the stability of such a feedback loop is highly sensitive
to input statistics.Modest changes in the input’s accuracy—an accuracy that
is no longer guaranteed—can wreak potentially catastrophic consequences
on the behavior of such a simple circuit, as we show in the section on for-
aging theory.
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3 Review of the Literature on Internet Addiction Disorder
Individuals around the world are using the Internet in ways that have a
negative impact on their lives (Cheng & Li, 2014). The phenomenon goes
by many names in the literature, and there are at least 29 independently
developed measures of Internet addiction (Tokunaga & Rains, 2010). Some
studies conceptualize “the Internet” as the Internet in general, while oth-
ers focus on a specific Internet activity (e.g., gaming, shopping, interacting
with social media, interacting with pornography; Montag et al., 2015). Vari-
ations in conceptualizations of the medium itself and the behavior associ-
ated with it reflect disagreements regarding nomenclature and disparities
among key variables and variable valuation principles. These inconsisten-
cies limit the generalizability of existing research. Other limiting factors in-
clude sampling techniques and small sample sizes (Tokunaga&Rains, 2010,
2016; King, Delfabbro, Griffiths, & Gradisar, 2011).
Although the general concept of Internet dependence has gained credi-
bility within the social and behavioral sciences as meta-analyses and neu-
roimaging findings continue to show continuity among related constructs
(Yao & Zhong, 2014; Tokunaga & Rains, 2010; Young, 1999), neither “In-
ternet addiction disorder” (IAD) nor “problematic Internet use” (PIU) is a
diagnosis recognized by the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnos-
tic and Statistical Manual (DSM). “Internet gaming disorder” is listed in ap-
pendix of the DSM-5 as a condition warranting further research.
3.1 Signs of Addiction/Problematic Use. Internet “addicts,” as deter-
mined by validated diagnostic instruments such as Young’s Internet Ad-
diction Test (IAT), typically present with problems regulating emotions,
impaired cognitive and interpretive skills (e.g., decreased sensitivity to
nonverbal messages), psychosocial distress (e.g., loneliness, depression,
anxiety), and reward sensitivity (Carbonell et al., 2016; Swingle, 2015;
Bipeta, Yerramilli, Karredla, &Gopinath, 2015; Young, 1999). Risk factors af-
fecting the speed and likelihood of developing clinically significant levels of
Internet dependence include boredom, shyness, marital discontent, work-
related stress, financial insecurity, general insecurity, and a limited offline
social life (Young & Rodgers, 1998; Tokunaga & Rains, 2010). Comorbidities
include ADHD, chemical and behavioral addictions, obsessive compulsive
disorder, hostility, and depression (Young & Rodgers, 1998; Bipeta et al.,
2015). The causal direction of these relationships remains to be definitively
determined, perhaps because internet dependence is a cyclical rather than a
linear process (Yao & Zhong, 2014; Caplan, 2003). Yet despite controversies,
there are consistent findings, which we summarize.
3.2 Neuroimaging. Neuroimaging studies show molecular, morpho-
logical, and circuit-level similarities in the brains of individuals suffer-
ing from Internet dependence, substance dependence, and pathological
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gaming, suggesting overlapping mechanisms at work in all three phenom-
ena (Hong, Zalesky, et al., 2013; Hong, Kim et al., 2013; Dong, Devito, Du,
& Cui, 2012; Lin et al., 2012; Yuan, Qin, Liu, & Tian, 2011; Yuan, Qin, Wang,
et al., 2011; Ko et al., 2009). Prolonged recreational Internet use has been
correlated with both task-related and resting-state abnormalities, including
abnormalities in graymatter volume andwhitematter fractional anisotropy
(FA) (Weng et al., 2013). These abnormalities correspond to observed behav-
ioral impairments in executive control, mental flexibility, emotional regu-
lation, response inhibition, goal-directed behavior, motivation and reward
processing, higher-order cognitive functions, and memory encoding and
retrieval. (For systematic review of neuroimaging studies to 2012 see Kuss
& Griffiths, 2012, and Brand, Young, & Laier, 2014.)
3.3 Impulse Control Disorder Tradition. Dysfunctional internet use
parallels substance dependency in several ways (Li & Chung, 2006; Zhou
et al., 2011). However, themore influential models of dysfunctional Internet
use see it as an impulse control disorder much like pathological gambling;
cognitive-behavioral therapy is recommended for treatment (Davis, 2001;
Young, 1996). Generally defined, impulsiveness names a predisposition to
react quickly to stimuli (external or internal) without regard for possible
negative outcomes (Moeller, Barratt, Dougherty, Schmitz, & Swann, 2001).
An individual suffering from pathological impulse control would tend to
act quickly and with little forethought in pursuit of “short-term gains that
accompany significant long-term costs” (Tokunaga & Rains, 2016). The In-
ternet is a particularly attractive stimulus in this context because, like slot
machines, its interactive nature supports the kind of unpredictable variable
reward structures used in classical instrumental conditioning processes
(Young & Nabuco de Abreu, 2010; Rossi & Yin, 2012).
Impulse control disorders involve psychological as well as physiologi-
cal dependence on the stimulus (Le Moal & Koob, 2007). Examples from
the DSM category “impulse-control disorders not elsewhere classified” in-
clude compulsive gambling, kleptomania, trichotillomania, and pyroma-
nia, among others (Holden, 2001). Factors generally understood to be part
of the impulse control model of problematic Internet use include viewing
the Internet as a source of instant gratification, euphoric sensations and
other rewards stemming from Internet use, tolerance, preoccupation with
the Internet, withdrawal, long-termnegative outcomes traceable to use, and
continued use of the Internet to escape aversive mood states (Tokunaga &
Rains, 2016; Cash et al., 2012; Young, 1999; Lesieur & Rosenthal, 1991; Chou
& Hsiao, 2000).
3.4 Uses and Gratification Tradition. Research in the uses and grati-
fication tradition conceives of the Internet as an accessible and attractive
communicative context because it offers escape from feelings of loneliness
or depression (Yao & Zhong, 2014; Young & Rodgers, 1998; Davis, 2001).
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Users can find other users any time of day or night, making the Internet
particularly useful for avoiding feelings of loneliness. It offers anonymity,
psychological distance, and structure—as well as increased control. Online
social success leads to positive alteration of mood (Caplan, 2003).
Online socializing, however, does not seem a sufficient substitute for of-
fline socializing (Chou&Hsiao, 2000), anduserswhoprefer the Internet as a
communicative context over face-to-face interactionmay be at higher risk of
developing Internet addiction (Caplan, 2003; Davis, 2001). Internet use ex-
pectancies (e.g., anticipating escape from an aversive mood) and poor cop-
ing skills have also been found to be reliable predictors of addiction (Brand
et al., 2014). Yao and Zhong (2014) confirmed findings by Chou and Hsio
(2000) demonstrating that while feelings of loneliness and other symptoms
of Internet addiction were reduced by offline socializing, an increase of on-
line socializing neutralized the effect. Moreover, online socializing by itself
did not reduce feelings of loneliness. Their findings suggest a “worrisome
vicious cycle between loneliness and Internet addiction” (Yao & Zhong,
2014).
3.5 PrevalenceRates. A2014meta-analysis of 31 nations in sevenworld
regions obtained an overall prevalence estimate of 6% with moderate het-
erogeneity. Following Young (2009), the authors defined what they termed
generalized Internet addiction (GIA) as “an impulse control problem char-
acterized by an inability to inhibit Internet use that exerts an adverse im-
pact on major life domains (e.g., interpersonal relations, physical health;
Cheng & Li, 2014). The authors conclude that, taken together, their find-
ings provide “tentative support” for the hypothesis that GIA prevalence is
related to quality of offline life, as reflected in indicators of subjective as-
sessment (life satisfaction) and objective quality (environmental conditions
such as traffic congestion, overall pollution, physical safety, and purchasing
power). The regionswith high prevalence ratesweremore unpleasant, with
lower life satisfaction rates and “greater overall pollution (primarily air pol-
lution), greater traffic commute time consumption, and lower national in-
come.” The analysis obtained a 10.9% prevalence rate in the Middle East
(the highest in the world) and a 2.6% prevalence rate in Northern andWest-
ern Europe (the lowest). The prevalence in North America was estimated to
be 8% (Cheng & Li, 2014). These data refute the common assumption that
prevalence rates are caused by Internet accessibility and align with data in
both the “uses and gratifications” and “impulse control” traditions that see
online life as an escape from offline difficulties.
As noted earlier, worldwide prevalence rate estimations vary. Cash
et al.’s (2012) summary of research in the field to 2012 reports that preva-
lence rate estimates for the United States and Europe range tenfold, from
1.5% up to 18.5%. These uncertainties underscore the importance of meta-
analytic work.
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4 Framework Overview
It is helpful to reviewbasic tenets of informationprocessing for readers from
other disciplines. The concept most central to this framework is the struc-
ture of continuous three-dimensional space-time. This construct supplies
the reference frame and data format that constitute our representational
paradigm and the principles bywhichwe convert sensorimotor stimuli into
numerical data.We also turn to the principles of mathematics, physics, data
science, signal processing, and control theory to further refine our char-
acterization of available sensorimotor data, describing potential stimulus
streams in terms of data format (as noted above), informational quantity
(entropy), coherence enrichment (statistical profile), and spatio temporal
qualities (latency). We use this same characterization of sensorimotor data
to arrange potential environments on a continuum ordered from least to
most nourishing in Figures 11 and 13 in the appendix.
We summarize the key terms below. An asterisk denotes further expla-
nation and quantification in the appendix.
4.1 Principles versus Neurons.* This framework’s foundational prin-
ciples do not refer to circuit elements caricatured from observations (dis-
crete neurons and connections) but rather to mathematical laws: laws of
mechanical resonance, active control, continuous representation, and in-
formation transfer. In principle, such laws might together circumscribe a
“zero-parameter” understanding of the human body/mind system based
primarily in math, and only secondarily on experimental evidence. Such an
understanding would be both powerful and neutral.
4.2 Attention. Inspired by Hills, we understand attention as the strat-
egy used by an active sensorimotor system to allocate computational re-
sources to the space it represents.
4.3 Continuous versus Categorical Representations.* Perception and
learning in traditional neuroscience usually refer to categorical distinctions,
such as object types, decisions, or behaviors. But a brain’s twin tasks of mil-
lisecond muscular coordination and the continuous representation of real-
ity require vastly more and better-structured information than categories
could ever provide. In our view, while categories can transport sensory in-
formation from the natural world, they are bad at representing it because
the natural world is continuous.
4.4 The Unconscious.* Implicit and explicit information processing
are different (Frith & Frith, 2008, 2003). Implicit (“unconscious”) informa-
tion processing denotes a prereflexive mode that is faster and less con-
trollable than explicit information processing (“conscious”), which is rule
based, more controlled, and reflexive. These two forms of processing are
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best conceptualized as a continuum (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Compu-
tational limits on consciousness indicate that the vast majority of sen-
sory and sensorimotor processing is implicit and inaccessible to conscious
recollection.
4.5 Neuromechanical Trust and Empathy. The word trust has meaning
in computer science, or rather two meanings. First, a computer can trust its
input data without authentication (binary signal-trust), as in the skipped
validation stages of Figure 2. Or a computer can trust its model of an ex-
ternal system (analog model-trust, as in equation 4.1 and Figure 4). Both of
these concepts are behind our conception of neuromechanical trust.
No one needs to tell you that your hand is connected to your elbow
or your feet are on the ground. You can feel it. That is neuromechanical
trust—the trust your nervous system has in its model of mechanical con-
figuration, which makes the world seem stable and predictable, a trust
statistically assembled from countless micro-interactions. Neuromechani-
cal trust in micro-saccades and coordinated vibrations of the eyeballs stabi-
lizes vision so perfectly it is unconscious. Neuromechanical trust in active
mechanical control of the cochlea (of the sort responsible for tintinnus) al-
lows us to localize sound sources to a few fingers-width in azimuth and
elevation, better than most other animals. Neuromechanical trust in whole-
body micro-tremors makes those vibrations imperceptible to us until one
holds laser pointers or binoculars.
The signal-processing metric of latency jitter is a good marker for neu-
romechanical trust, and hence for trust in general. And the metric of neu-
romechanical trust is a good marker for social trust, which arises from the
same inputs, outputs, and circuits as does neuromechanical trust, and so
ought to be described by the same concepts.
Neuromechanical trust is the most information-dense and reliable form
of trust possible, atop which derivative forms of trust can then be built
using the same statistical algorithms and often the same sensors. As a
data-intensive sensorimotor experience, neuromechanical trust requires
physical proximity so that the signals from all sensory modalities are maxi-
mally informative and consistent. Like an authentication value in computer
science, neuromechanical trust must be reestablishedwith each connection;
it cannot be simply inherited or copied. Because establishing neuromechan-
ical trust requires continuous, authentic sensory signals, it cannot arise from
representations, categories, or digitized inputs. It can only be built on prox-
imity experience.
Neuromechanical trust in other people constitutes empathy. We predict
that one’s capacity for empathy, “the ability to comprehend another’s feel-
ings and to re-experience them oneself” (Salovey & Mayer, 1990), is cor-
related with one’s capacity for neuromechanical trust in other beings. We
treat all forms of trust, including interpersonal trust, as lower-bandwidth
versions of the statistical trust one has in one’s balance or one’s senses. The
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Figure 1: Compressed versions of reality. At atomic resolution, an actual rose,
fixed in time, could be said to contain 1045 bytes/sec of information. But de-
pending on the resolution and format, a compressed representation of the same
rose could occupy from 1014 bytes/sec down to 4 bytes.
advantage of neuromechanical trust as a clinical measure rests with its rel-
ative ease and neutrality of measurement.
Empathy can thus be considered a physical resonance practice and the
only possible cure for loneliness.
4.6 Compressed Representations. A picture can be worth a thousand
words or, equivalently, a few kilobytes—that is, 5000 characters at 1 byte
each or, equivalently, a medium-sized, slightly pixelated image. Such met-
rics and such principles underlie all our results, because both sensory
and digital processing involve the same compression trade-offs between
input data flow, output resolution, and statistical assumptions linking
them.
Discrete digital information can sometimes be compressed without loss,
but continuous signals cannot. For example, consider a rose in a garden
(see Figure 1). The original rose contains effectively infinite information,
or at least as much information as the arrangement of its atoms. The same
rose modeled volumetrically, with volume-elements (i.e., voxels) the size
of typical pixels, would use a tiny fraction of the atomic scale value, and
coarser representations would use even less, all the way down to the few
bytes needed for a word or icon, whose savings come from dispensing with
the original detail.
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Figure 2: Steps for encoding information from continuous fields. Each num-
bered step describes a part of a system for converting continuous information
into quantized form and back again, compressing and then uncompressing it.
In systems optimized for efficiency, signal trust is assumed, so authentication
steps 1, 2, 6, and 7 are skipped, forming a potential security vulnerability.
4.7 Bayesian Priors and Assumptions. One cannot analyze data or de-
compress signals without making statistical assumptions, and the strength
of those a priori assumptions about signal patterns directly affects the reso-
lution of decompressed object representation. Assumptions must be made
about the shapes and patterns to be found, based on statistical redundan-
cies (i.e., the structure) known to be present in natural images and objects
(Olshausen, 2016). By narrowing the space of allowed patterns, such priors
proportionately improve resolution if enforced during decompression.
For example, driving the tens of millions of pixels on a high-definition
screen would nominally require 1 gigabyte per second of data if individ-
ual pixelswere statistically independent. But bymaking assumptions about
smooth, continuous contours and contiguous surfaces, the decompression
technology inHDTV devices creates beautifully realistic images using a rel-
ative trickle (less than 1%) of that raw information flow.
4.8 Compression and Decompression Occur in Stages.* Those who
frequently use digital devices are already familiar with the central concepts
underlying compression, in particular, encoding, transmission, and decod-
ing of streamed images, as shown in Figure 2.
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4.9 Bandwidth.* The quality of a representation depends on its infor-
mation content, or rate in bytes per second, so sensory bandwidth limits the
quality of sensory representations. The lowest-bandwidth senses are smell
and taste, because they change so slowly; we leave them out of our anal-
ysis. In descending bandwidth order, our top three channels are touch, vi-
sion, and sound. Their collective bandwidth ranges from about 10 kBit up
to 10 Mbit, depending on whether the neural spikes are averaged together
in a rate code or treated separately in a pulse code.
4.10 Noise.* Variability in nature is noisy and random, and can be av-
eraged into better signals. Variability in the digital world, in contrast, was
sculpted just for us, in that the structure of its variability, such as flickering
pixels, can either take advantage of or block our signal-averaging abilities.
The process of encoding or digitizing automatically designates some sig-
nals as noise, but that choice is arbitrary. As Carver Mead once said, “One
man’s noise is another man’s information” (Softky, 2014).
4.11 Diffusion and Sharpening. Diffusion, when applied to the parti-
cles in a distribution, blurs or coarsens the distribution and thus lowers the
information it can convey. It needs no extra energy, only thermal jostling.
A good mathematical approximation involves convolving the distribution
with a local-averaging function such as a gaussian bell curve. Paradoxically,
at the particle level, diffusion is the most entropy-increasing process possi-
ble, but its net result of smoothing lowers the entropy of patterns that can
be represented in the medium.
Sharpening is the opposite of diffusion but is rarer because (like other
forms of amplification) it needs extra energy. Mathematically, sharpening
enhances the local derivative of a signal instead of its local average.
4.12 Signal Formats and Metrics.* Sensorimotor data and interactions
are perhaps the most important theoretical constructs in this framework.
In information technology, valid signals must have the proper format to be
trustworthy. Brains expect sensory spikes from continuous natural sources
in proximity and expect that signals from all sensory modalities will arrive
in synchrony, unfractured. Because the nervous system compresses and de-
compresses signals from those sources during sensorimotor activity, we can
apply traditional signal-processingmetrics to quantify both natural sensori-
motor and digital signals, even those lacking the proper format. In Figure 3
and (Table 2 in the appendix) we illustrate eight such metrics for sensori-
motor input as a template for the more complex sensorimotor interactions
that actually occur.
4.13 Media and Interface Distortions.* An interface lies between the
organic sensorimotor system and the calibration field. Originally that inter-
face was air. We consider air as neutral because it is consistent, transmitting
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Figure 3: Interfacemetrics described over a continuous embedding space. Each
metric is a scalar correlatedwith information flow. (1) Ahuman calibration field
must be topologically consistent with our native 3D data format to obtain a
nonzero value for this metric. (2) After encoding format, the most important
requirement of calibration signals is that they involve as many senses as pos-
sible. An easy estimate of cross-sensory interaction is given by the square of
the number of senses involved, so a measure of 1.0 describes full sensory fu-
sion and 0.04 a monosensory stream. The other metrics shown are well known
in signal processing: (3) round-trip latency from motor signal to response;
(4) moment-to-moment jitter in that latency; (5) the maximum duration of cal-
ibration episodes; (6) the bandwidth of the sensory return signal; (7) the noise
added to the signal; and (8) the fraction of the input that is not selected or bi-
ased by the interface. Not each metric will matter in every circumstance, but all
matter sometime. Digital media fare far worse on all metrics than unimpeded
access to the natural calibration field.
signals with maximum fidelity along each of the eight metrics of Figure 3.
Relative to it, digital communications are nonneutral in many ways, in par-
ticular by decreased bandwidth, lower temporal fidelity, and more inter-
ruptions. (Figure 13 and Table 3 in the appendix quantify many of these
distortions for digital technologies.)
4.14 Natural Statistics.* The neuroscientific concept of natural statistics
distinguishes the fractal complexity of natural scenes from the simplified
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structure of man-made cages and buildings. We explore this distinction in
depth in section 5.
4.15 Prediction Engine Models. Neuroscience has long described the
brain’s primary task as modeling reality. The model created can be con-
ceived of as a particular form of informational structure: a real-time,
unsupervised prediction engine that correlates prior knowledge of the
spatiotemporal structure of theworldwith advance-correlated signals com-
ing from it, signals we term leading indicators. By “prediction engine,” we
do not mean a specific set of neural pathways. Rather, the term denotes
the computational principles by which the algorithmic processing of neu-
ral impulses predicts the immediate high-dimensional sensory future (as
if predicting pixels), and from the prediction-reality mismatch generates a
high-dimensional error signal (Softky, 1996; Seth, 2015).
Prediction as a process has two requirements: good priors and gooddata.
Bayesian priors are the statistical assumptions underlying any data analy-
sis. For a brain, they could be strong assumptions such as three-dimensional
continuous motion (3-D priors) (Softky, 2014), moderate assumptions such
as Marr’s (2010) 2.5-D sketchpad, weak assumptions such as the hierarchi-
cal segmentation of deep learning (LeCun, Benglo, & Hinton, 2015), or the
assumption of continuous sequences (Cui, Ahmad, & Hawkins, 2016). Re-
gardless, the accuracy of a brain’s predictions will still in each case also be
proportional to the quality and quantity of the sensorimotor data available
to it.
4.16 Calibration as a Process.* Instruments are calibrated by engineers
and scientists to maintain resolution, noise immunity, and robustness. But
strictly speaking, calibration applies less to the physical instrument than
to a model of its input/output relations. So in the broadest sense, the goal
of calibration is to produce a trustworthy model, operating over as wide
a range and with as small an error as possible. In this sense, a trustwor-
thy model would roughly maximize model trust, which we can represent
relationally as follows:
Model trust = model range
model prediction error
. (4.1)
Our understanding of calibration in general is summarized in Figure 4.
4.17 Self-Calibration. Wemodel brains as high-resolution instruments
requiring continuous tuning and calibration via learning and plasticity. But
as with many learning models (and unlike most instruments), a brain’s cal-
ibration must be unsupervised, so it must forage through space for cali-
bration signals while foraging for survival, using similar strategies. This
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Figure 4: Calibration. (A) Process. Because calibration tends to improve model
resolution and the resolution of the model and of the instrument’s outputs
should be commensurate, one expects various output measures (e.g., ampli-
tude) to decrease over time. (B) Examples of well-known calibration processes.
calibration must occur at multiple timescales simultaneously—for exam-
ple, stabilizing millisecond-scale balance at the same time as year-scale so-
cial relationships. While our approach describes sensorimotor learning in
terms of signal processing and information theory, substantially the same
concepts are involved in learning “sensorimotor contingencies” (O’Regan
& Noe, 2001). Our models are described in detail in the section 6.
4.18 Palatability.* We assume informational organisms will seek to re-
calibrate by seeking clean, unambiguous signals in natural environments.
That is, theywill find such signals attractive and palatable in some informa-
tional sense like “interestingness” (Schmidhuber, 2009) or “curiosity” (Little
& Sommer, 2013). We map this appetite for clean sensory data to the con-
cept of attractiveness or “palatability” (Lutter & Nestler, 2009; Na, Morris,
Johnson, Beltz, & Johnson, 2006).
4.19 Sign-Reversing Feedback Loops.* When organisms are operating
outside the statistical environments in which they evolved, their expected
homeostatic balance can be upset, and stable negative feedback can be in-
verted into positive feedback in a situation called sign reversal.
Maladaptive states like addiction can result when an instinct to cor-
rect a problem makes the problem worse, thereby turning an initially sta-
ble negative-feedback loop into a self-reinforcing positive-feedback one, a
catastrophic process that a survey in Psychological Review dubs “homeo-
static fragility” (Ramsay & Woods, 2014). The review describes how vari-
ous biological feedback loops can change their signs in environments not
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anticipated by evolution—loops such as energy balance (Strubbe & van
Dijk, 2002), salt concentration (Na et al., 2006), or opioid analgesia (Slot,
Pauwels, & Colpaert, 2002). Ramsay andWoods (2014) clearly state the cen-
tral theoretical issue: “Health problems such as drug addiction and obesity
(as well as other disorders of modern society) may result from homeostatic
fragility exposed by evolutionarily unanticipated perturbations.” As their
first example, the authors cite “an effector response that eventually overcor-
rects an initial perturbation (i.e. causes a sign-reversal) despite the contin-
ued presence of the disturbance.” We fear that digital addictions manifest
this simple principle.
4.20 Evolutionary Pressures. The human nervous system has adapted
to best survive in a natural environment, presumably in the direction of op-
timized fitness. Artificial signals, both physical and cultural, have evolved
far more quickly, rewarded by fitness metrics such as palatability, cost, pro-
ductivity, easy of transmission, durability, and so on. Both forms of evolu-
tion constitute optimization, and both produce optima that by definition
have low entropy. But the optimum of human DNAenhances our ability to
process a naturally noisy environment, while the optimum of artificial sig-
nals creates a low-entropy environment unfamiliar to our nervous systems.
5 Metrics of Trust for Natural and Artificial Inputs
5.1 The Structure of Calibration Fields. We begin by discussing the
space fromwhich the data originate—their “embedding space”—whichwe
assume is three-dimensional continuous space over continuous time (i.e.,
R4). The primary structural constraints on the calibration field are topo-
logical (e.g., continuous and connected) and dimensional (e.g., 3D). Hu-
man brains, like all other brains, operate three-dimensional host bodies in
three-dimensional environments. For most of our time on this earth, our
brains have regularly consumed sensorimotor data originating in continu-
ous space-time, a four-dimensional “realworld” described by real numbers.
Brains evolved long ago to process only data encoded in this format.
Screen-based displays do not transmit signals with this format, however
fine their resolution. Mathematically, a million-pixel screen does not show
a three-dimensional scene, but rather a two-dimensional projection of a
three-dimensional sub-manifold of a million-dimensional space of pixels.
Algorithms exist for discovering low-dimensional curved submanifolds
embedded in high-dimensional spaces (Roweis & Saul, 2000; Tenenbaum,
de Silva, & Langford, 2000), but the need for such algorithms and the dif-
ficulties of their implementation confirm that those two spaces are not
equivalent.
We next derive the continuous statistical properties of calibration fields
from the physical patterns most often found in nature: temporal patterns,
spatiotemporal patterns, natural entropy, and social patterns.
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Figure 5: Spatiotemporal scales and patterns of the calibration field. Natural
calibration fields are almost entirely continuous in space and time, spanning
millimeters to kilometers and milliseconds to years. (A) Natural cycles and in-
terruptions include regular oscillations such as days and years (delta function
frequencies), along with rare, unpredictable interruptions such as lighting (bell
curve timescales). (B) Artificial cycles and interruptions include faster divisions
of time and far more unpredictable interruptions. (C) Dynamic natural patterns
embedded in 4D space-time. Several types of natural fractal patterns, such as
branching and fracturing, span orders of magnitude in both space and time
(time-changing fractals could include a fern unfurling or a rivulet spreading).
The “pattern” of a tree species corresponds to its statistical profile of root den-
sity, twig size, and branching angles rather than to the specific detail of any
particular tree.
5.2 Temporal Patterns. Natural temporal patterns are continuous in
time and often predictable, from microsecond pressure fluctuations like
sound to millennia-long climate changes and even longer astronomical
cycles. Among those smooth trends and cycles occur occasional sudden
events like eruptions and lightning, but even those arise from continuous
equations of motion; no natural events are truly discontinuous, utterly un-
predictable interruptions (see Figure 5A). While modern life also contains
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Figure 6: Natural patterns sorted by entropy and duration. Spatial patterns in
the forest or savanna are ambiguous, complex, detailed, and diverse (i.e., of high
entropy). In that environment, simple low-entropy patterns are rare and often
fleeting, but those provide the cleanest signals.
regular cycles such as 60 Hz alternating current and 60 minute hours, it
also contains discontinuous interruptions such as phone calls andmessages
(see Figure 5B), which cannot be predicted from locally available signals.
The extreme hyperpredictability of narrow-band vibrations can decalibrate
broadband sensory circuits, and the absolute unpredictability of remote in-
terruptions can trigger discontinuity-detecting and alerting circuits.
5.3 Spatiotemporal Patterns. Spatiotemporal sources in the natural
world are mostly fractal, at least to first-order approximation, so the pat-
terns emanating from them will be too. Figure 5C caricatures the structure
of spatial and spatiotemporal patterns in the naturalworld, sorted by space-
and timescale. All of these patterns are continuous in space. Most have the
highly irregular statistics of particles (e.g., fog droplets) or fractally corru-
gated surfaces (e.g., moss, trees, waves, mountains). Artificial spatiotem-
poral patterns appear in such a wide variety of man-made media, rang-
ing from asphalt sidewalks to smartphone screens, that their description
is more diverse (see the appendix). In general, their display format is low-
dimensional (screens or speakers), their structure is ultra-high-dimensional
and quantized (pixels and frames), and the principles of their construction
are biased toward influencing the human nervous system.
5.4 Natural Entropy Patterns. Figure 6 sorts the same natural sources
shown above—rivers, clouds, gravel and such—according to entropy, plot-
ting themost cluttered patterns (e.g., raindrops) at the top and the least clut-
tered patterns at the bottom. Our self-calibration analysis says that humans
should find attractive low-entropy natural patterns such as crystals, with
pure colors, truly flat faces, uniform composition, and smooth surfaces.
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In general, artificial patterns (both physical and digital) have far lower
entropy than natural ones because they arrive via the iterated low-entropy-
amplificationfilter of optimization,which over time produces some equilib-
rium distribution of artificial patterns. One can guess at that distribution’s
structure. Auseful analog is the distribution of activemodes in a laser cavity
(e.g., TEM-00). Of course cultural norms are not photons, and a media echo
chamber is not a Fabry-Perot mirror cavity. But both amplify information
selectively, both are resource constrained, and both experience mode com-
petition. Lasers produce coherent,monochromatic light, the lowest-entropy
electromagnetic patterns possible.Material communication producesmate-
rially productive physical patterns, also of low entropy compared to the nat-
ural variability of human communication. Evidence of low-entropymodern
environments is as close as the nearest flat wall or floor (Barrett, 2014). (See
the appendix for a detailed comparison of the entropy of natural versus
artificial patterns.)
5.5 Social Patterns. Social patterns are the significant subset of natu-
ral sources and sounds that emanate not from rocks and trees but from
fellow creatures. Though incredibly intricate, that manifold would contain
human-specific spatiotemporal structures (gait, posture, gesture) useful for
calibration and communication at all timescales from milliseconds to years
(Vogeley & Bente, 2010). While human motion and social interaction seem
incredibly complex on their own, in fact they have relatively low entropy
compared to turbulence or jumbled sticks and stones and thus provide sig-
nals specially tuned to our own nervous systems.
In general, natural communications are vibratory, high bandwidth, and
temporally precise, while artificial ones are quantized, low bandwidth, and
desynchronized. Because social trust arises from the same inputs and cir-
cuits as does neuromechanical trust, what degrades one will degrade the
other.
6 Foraging Models of Self-Calibration
We assume that creatures evolved to find the information they need. Re-
search conducted byBromberg-Martin andHikosaka (2009) shows that “the
same dopamine neurons that signal primitive rewards like food and wa-
ter also signal the cognitive reward of advance information.” They con-
clude that “current theories of reward-seeking must be revised to include
information-seeking.” We build on this generalized concept of informa-
tional reward to understand how a creature can not only forage for useful
information, but can keep itself in a state of perpetual self-calibration by
means of homeostatic mechanisms (which nonetheless may be brittle be-
cause of homeostatic fragility). We use off-the-shelf techniques from other
disciplines, in particular, foraging theory (from economics and behavioral
biology) and control loop theory. The key assumption is that any circuit
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will have evolved tomatch a particular statistical environmental profile and
thus will implicitly expect its environment to obey that statistical contract.
6.1 Foraging Theory Background. The term information foraging was
coined by Pirolli and Card (1999) when they adapted an evolutionary bi-
ology model of optimal food foraging to predict the behavior of humans
who forage for information. Developed by Eric Charnov (1976), the original
model of animal foraging behavior represents the patchy resource distribu-
tions characteristic of nature; the mathematics representing this behavior is
known as the marginal value theorem (MVT). Pirolli and Card (1999) used
MVT to identify those factors influencing the timing of movement from one
resource patch to another.
We adapt their model for several reasons. Pirolli and Card (1999) con-
ceptualize information in the colloquial sense: information contained in
words and documents, that is, information that is quantized, static, and
consciously accessible. This common conceptualization of information does
not permit comparison between natural and artificial information sources.
Moreover, as we have shown, the magnitude of such information is tiny
compared to the Shannon information transmitted by natural sources.
Charnov’s canonical model represents possible principles governing the
search for resources in a physical environment using “birds” that hop be-
tween discrete “bushes” full of berries (see Figure 7a). A bird decides to
leave one bush for another when the marginal benefit (including switch-
ing costs) exceeds the benefit of staying on the present one. Charnov’s ba-
sic hypothesis was that “when feasible, natural information systems evolve
toward stable states that maximize gains of valuable information per unit
cost.” This approach sees information as a resource distributed in space, to
be sought by spatial foraging strategies. Such maximization leads to near-
optimal hopping, but intermittent hopping cannot implement the continu-
ous controlwe seek.Nor does the berry bushmodel of resources adequately
approximate the reduced costs involved in online information foraging. Fi-
nally, maximizing anything is different from tracking metabolic needs.
Gazzaley andRosen (2016) have already applied foraging theory to Inter-
net addiction. They did so in order to “explain our seemingly constant need
to switch our focused attention in response to either an external alert or in-
ternal trigger”—even when we know that such switching creates “resump-
tion lags” that have a negative impact on productivity. In their adaptation,
different online portals (e.g., mobile phones, tablets, laptops) represent dif-
ferent berry bushes. They use their model to knit together empirical work
on multitasking, showing that the behavior is motivated by both internal
and external factors.
Crucially, they differentiate between the 3-space in which our informa-
tional appetites evolved and theN-space of the Internet. The difference lies
in the mathematical way distance is measured (i.e., in the structure of met-
ric spaces). In the real world (i.e., 3-space), interesting things take time to
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Figure 7: Models of resource foraging and control. (a) The canonical foraging
model is of birds eating and depleting berries from bushes. This model max-
imizes consumption and does not track metabolic needs. (b) Our alternative
postulates a continuous gradient of resource density through which a forager
can navigate to meet its needs via homeostatic control. (c) To accommodate
metabolic needs for multiple resource types (e.g., “calories” and “fiber”), both
resource types may be co-joined with matching density gradients. (d) An alter-
native resource gradient is of enrichment, in which the relative fraction of the
two resources changes over space. These distribution statistics prove problem-
atic, being different in one crucial way from those the circuit evolved to process.
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find, because as you move a distance R, the region in which you can search
increases at most with R2 (corresponding to surface area of an ordinary
sphere). In contrast, on the Internet, instant gratification is but a click away
in any one of thousands of directions (dimension N = 1000), not just the
three directionswe are used to. At each of those thousand new locations, an-
other thousand branch off, ad nauseum. One can perform the same surface
area calculation as before,merely by replacing the three-dimensional sphere
(N = 3) with a hypersphere (N = 1000). The surface area of a hypersphere
increases with RN−1. This is far faster than the R2 our nervous systems ex-
pect. The importance of this difference cannot be overstated. Gazzaley and
Rosen (2016) conclude, as we do, that the excess of immediate confirma-
tion signals available online hijacks our native mechanisms for attention
management.
Yet because we model both behavior and nature as continuous in all re-
spects, our approach differs from Gazzaley and Rosen’s (2016) in modeling
foraging as feedback control (rather than discrete decisions) and informa-
tional resource distribution as gradients (rather than patches).
To show how a general class of simple biorealistic circuits, whose struc-
ture and hardwired parameters originally “evolved” in one statistical en-
vironment, can become unstable when immersed in a different statistical
environment, we offer two related sets of models: one set describing envi-
ronments and other describing the control circuits that navigate in them.We
model the environment in three progressively more complex ways. First is
as a foraging field containing a single quickly measurable resource whose
density various over space. We dub this resource “calories” to capture the
quickness of the measurement (the sense of taste registers immediately).
Our next two foraging fields contain two related resources, “calories” along
with a new resource we dub “fiber,” whose defining characteristic is that it
can only be measured slowly, in the sense that roughage can be felt in the
gut after some time has passed. In our second foraging field, these two re-
sources have a fixed concentration ratio, whose joint density varies over
space (see Figure 7c). Our third and final foraging field also contains those
same two resources, but nowwith a fixed overall density, whose concentra-
tion ratio varies over space (see Figure 7d).
In each of those environments, our continuous foraging circuit uses
closed-loop control to implement simple foraging. This is a toy model, as
applicable to metabolic drives as to informational ones. The mechanismwe
highlight is simple: the circuits’ negative-feedback loops, adapted in one
statistical environment to be self-correcting and stable, convert in a different
statistical environment into positive-feedback loops that are self-amplifying
and unstable. In effect, we highlight statistically definable combinations of
circuitry and environment prone to become addicted to ever quicker, coarse
responses. Because this effect shares self-reinforcing dynamics with addic-
tion and is driven by quicklymeasured signals, we call it “leading indicator
dependency.”
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6.2 Environment Models: Density Gradient and Concentration
Gradient
6.2.1 Models. In our model, the berry-eating bird resides in a world
where resources are distributed along a smooth local gradient measured
in “calories.” There are no discrete berry bushes, only a continuous berry
field, changing in berry density smoothly along its length, from sparse at
one end up to bountiful at the other (see Figure 7b).
We nowmodify this baselinemodel to add a single new resource: “fiber.”
In our simplified world, we assume that fiber and calories exist with some
concentration ratioK. In one scenario (see Figure 7c),K isfixed across space,
so that the gradients of calories and fiber are always the same, even as den-
sity varies. We term this the “natural scenario.” In the second scenario (see
Figure 7d), K varies over the field while density is fixed. We call this the
“enriched scenario.”
6.2.2 Principles. Our berry-eating bird is stupid; it does not rest if it feels
sated but instead merely moves to eat in a lower-density region. In the lan-
guage of control theory, our bird’s effectors controlling feeding speed share
one fixed rate, so that only the spatial location effectormay vary. Thismeans
that the forager has only one degree of freedom: it controls its calorie con-
sumption and navigates in space by following the local calorie gradient.
Thus, regardless of the various resources or their distribution profile, it al-
ways navigates using the local cue of calorie concentration.
6.3 One-Parameter Foraging model (Density Gradient). A simple cir-
cuit can illustrate the principles of homeostatic control, measuring the
single parameter calories (as measured during ingestion) to regulate the
creature’s feeding rate.
6.3.1 Model and Principles. Our circuit (see Figure 8a) is a classical
proportional-integral-differential (PID) controller, as introduced by
Schenck (1987, equation 5) to explain biological homeostatis. This PID
controller makes a consumption variable, C, match a reference need, N, in
the simplest way:
d
dt
C = KP (N −C)+ KD ddt (N −C)+ KI
∫
(N −C)dt. (6.1)
For our continuous forager, the reference value Ncal represents the crea-
ture’s current metabolic need (in calories), and its consumption Ccal rep-
resents its attempt to meet that need, delayed by the (early) timescale τcal
at which caloric intake can be measured. Unlike in many control-theoretic
treatments, here we do not prove stability of the control loop, but assume
it, in order to understand possible instabilities later.
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Figure 8: A simple control loop controls consumption via navigation. (a) The
block diagramof a PID controller tomake consumptionCmatchmetabolic need
N (measured in calories). (b) The circuit finds new equilbria in response to per-
turbations: (1) displacing the forager creates a calorie mismatch, which drives
it to return to its starting point, while (2) changing the overall calorie density
forces the forager to forage in a different location. (c) This feedback loop is sta-
ble because it combines amplification with subtraction.
Typically, the coefficients (KP, KD, and KI ) are tuned to optimize the ac-
curacy and lag of control, but here we need only a general description of
when this process succeeds versus fails. The key ingredient for success is the
self-correcting negative feedback loop: as C rises, the three difference terms
(N −C) reduce below zero, limiting further increase ofC (see Figure 8c). Ac-
cording to Psychological Review’s most recent summary of controversies in
homeostatic regulation, this negative sign is crucial: “Indeed, a fundamen-
tal premise of any regulatory system is that deviations (or anticipated de-
viations) of regulated variables are detected and trigger effector responses
that counter (or mitigate) the deviation” (Ramsay &Woods, 2014). Few ref-
erences even discuss what might happen if the feedback became positive.
6.3.2 Observations. The loop can be seen as stable by its response to per-
turbations (see Figure 8b). If the forager is moved to a new location (the
first event in Figure 8b), its newly modified appetites will return it to the
original location. If one modifies the environment to decrease the berries’
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caloric density (the second event), then soon, within τcal , the forager will
move—this time permanently—to a new location restoring the former calo-
rie consumption—the expected behavior for such a control loop.
6.4 Two-Parameter Foraging Model (Density Gradient). The single-
variable control loop abovemeets a single need, (in this case, “calories”), but
real creatures havemultiple needs and face trade-offs inmeasuring and act-
ing on them all simultaneously. In an environment with a common gradient
of two resources (calories and fiber), a forager chasing calories is automati-
cally chasing fiber as well, so that the forager can successfully translate the
need for fiber into an appetite for calories.
6.4.1 Model. Our circuit alreadymeasures calorie ingestion quickly, with
timescale τcal as it navigates the local calorie gradient. Now, in addition, we
allow for the forager’s actual need Ncal to be measured separately and at a
slower timescale τmet by themetabolic system as a ground truth. The forager
is still using the same strategy as before, but now its inputs and processing
have changed.
To accommodate this slightly more complex problem space, we mod-
ify our forager toy model (see Figure 9) by adding four features. The first
change is distinguishing two distinctmeasurement timescales: the early but
approximate one that measures calories in real time versus the delayed but
authoritative timescale of confirmedmetabolic needs after the fact. The sec-
ond modification is to add a parallel measurement of the need for fiber,
Nfiber, also measured with slower τmet. The third is to create a free-standing
system that estimates the calories-to-fiber ratio Kest of the food supply in
order to calculate how many calories it must consume (N’fiber) to meet the
fiber needs. The final modification is to select the maximum of the twin
needs—for calories and for fiber—as the single input to the existing calorie-
only circuit. This last modification forges the perfect compromise, using
each input according to its particular specialty and compensating for its
weakness.
So we have two interacting circuits: outermost, a slow and ultimately
unimpeachable verification of the forager’s overall need for food; inner-
most, a much faster circuit that can find and consume the food it needs in
real time using its fast-acting sense of taste. This circuit is optimal in several
senses: (1) it uses the simplest control circuit for its core task (move and con-
sume); (2) its reference signals (Ncal and Nfiber) are accurate models of the
forager’s ultimate needs; (3) it uses its ownmetabolic-best-fit estimate (Kest )
to meet those needs by controlling only one parameter; (4) it converges the
single-parameter loop as quickly as possible by using a low-latency but
approximate signal (Ncal at τcal ); and (5) it couples the two circuits and
timescales minimally to avoid complex interactions. These circuit prop-
erties could be considered optimal because they use reasonable assump-
tions about the natural environment—that calorie consumption tracks fiber
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Figure 9: Modified loop controls two co-joined resources whose ratio is fixed.
(a) The same circuit as before, nowmodified to forage for the greater of two sep-
arate metabolic needs. (b) This circuit exhibits stable equilibrium in response to
changes in either parameter (location or density). (c) The stable response to per-
turbations in density occurs, as before, because subtractive interactions produce
negative closed-loop feedback.
consumption, or that berry composition remains uniform—to combine
multiple, imperfect data sources into a collectively reliable stream. We can-
not say this toymodel is natural, but it is naturalistic insofar as nature tends
to converge on simple and optimal solutions.
6.4.2 Principles. It is hard to overestimate the importance of simplicity
to the performance of such a circuit. Foraging requires response speed, re-
sponse speed requires throughput, and throughput requires simple compu-
tations on readily available signalswithmaximal assumptions andminimal
validation. In information processing, any slowdown costs toomuch. Here,
both simplicity and speed come from using leading indicators, a business
term for signals advance-correlated with metrics of interest.
Leading indicators are such a useful processing trick that nature seems
to have wired them to be learned from experience, as explained by the
homeostasis survey: “Perhaps the most compelling examples of anticipa-
tory regulatory strategies involve the use of initially arbitrary cues that, by
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virtue of prior associative experience, become conditioned to elicit correc-
tive responses” (Ramsay & Woods, 2014). In fact, Hills’s (2006) theory of
goal-directed search finds support for learning leading indicators not only
from foraging theory, but from detailed agreement with empirical work
in algorithmic modeling, molecular genetics, and behavioral ecology: “The
evidence strongly supports the evolution of goal-directed cognition out of
mechanisms initially in control of spatial foraging but, through increasing
cortical connections, eventually used to forage for information.”
6.4.3 Observations. Wecan show this circuit is stable, as before, by adding
perturbations. In the traces of Figure 9d, the first event displaces the forager,
and as before, the forager quickly returns to its point of homeostatic equi-
librium. The second event changes the nutritional composition of the berry
field (more calories, less fiber), and as before, the forager moves to a new
location that meets its needs using the new food supply. This second move
has two components, one fast and one slow, moving in opposite directions.
When the calorie densityfirst rises, consumption spikes above demand (Ccal
trace), so that the forager’s first response is to eat less. Unfortunately, reduc-
ing food intake reduces fiber intake even further (less fiber per calorie in the
new food multiplied by less food eaten). Fortunately, the metabolic loop
slowly discovers the deficit as it calculates Kest, thereby boosting N’fiber,
and the nonlinear max() function lets this term dominate the consumption
circuit to ingest more food instead of less. Such stable self-correction across
environmental parameters is how this sort of a circuit ought to behave.
This success comes from using Ccal as a leading indicator, which con-
verges faster than waiting for more accurate but slower signals like N’fiber.
This trick is possible only because, in this environment, the consumptions
of fast calories and slow fiber are correlated, so a single circuit measuring
a single resource can guarantee consumption floors for both resource types
at once.
The two-parameter toy circuit above seems nearly ideal for our two-
parameter toy environment because it uses minimal modifications to a
simple, well-characterized control circuit to merge fast, coarse information
(Ccal ) with slow, precise information (N’fiber andNcal ). But that assumption
depends on the statistical profile of the toy environment, in particular, that
its enrichment has no spatial gradient. What happens if that constraint is
lifted, so that the calorie gradient is different from the fiber gradient?
6.5 Two-Parameter Foraging Model (Enrichment Gradient)
6.5.1 Model and Principles. The circuit model remains the same as above,
but in the new, enriched environment, on one side of the field are calorie-
enriched berries and, on the other, fiber-enriched berries, so that berry den-
sity is fixed while berry concentration varies (see Figure 10). That means
the bird, when it navigates toward calorie-enriched berries, thus navigates
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Figure 10: Enrichment gradient creates catastrophic instability. (a) The same
modified circuit as before, but now foraging where high-calorie and high-fiber
resources are separated in space, so that foraging for calories reduces fiber in-
take. (b) Responses to displacing the forager (1) toward higher-calorie food at
first compensate for the immediate overconsumption of calories, but because
fiber intake declines, this response exacerbates the problem. (c) This instabil-
ity is not merely a failure to maintain control, but a critical conversion from a
stable negative-feedback control loop into a highly unstable positive-feedback
one: increased consumption Ccal increases X, and hence K, and hence Kest, in
turn increasing Ccal further.
away from fiber-enriched berries. Eating more calories now reduces fiber
consumption instead of increasing it. The circuit has stayed the same, but
the environment has flipped the sign of the control loop.
6.5.2 Observations. This model produces sign reversal as a result of prin-
cipled design choices. The circuit’s attempt to increasefiber consumption by
increasing calorie consumption proves to be doomed in this environment.
Consuming more calories now means consuming less fiber. As shown in
Figure 10, the enrichment gradient makes previously stable circuit proper-
ties become unstable: the more calories the forager finds (increasingK), the
hungrier it becomes, ad infinitum. The rising curves at left reinforce each
other, so the circuit has no stable equilibrium point.
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6.5.3 Leading Indicators May Inform Homeostatic Sign Reversal and Salience
Attribution. The sign reversal we find differs in several key ways from the
best-known model of sign-reversal mechanisms in biological systems (Slot
et al., 2002). That simple numerical model has no spatial navigation and
controls a single parameter, as in our Figure 8. It allows an arbitrary constant
w (not necessarily 1.0) in calculating the control signal (our ") and finds
sign-reversal effects for a seemingly unrealistic value of w = 4. Our model
has no free parameters, it compresses two quasi-independent signals into
one, and it explicitly navigates across palatability gradients.
But the similarities are revealing: bothmodels involve homeostatic loops
gone awry in evolutionarily novel environments, both subtract long-term
averages from current values, and both involve conflicts between fast- ver-
sus slow-resolving measurements of crucial parameters. Such an astonish-
ing overlap of mechanisms, inferred from disparate systems yet united in
their addictive outcomes, cries out for more thorough mathematical un-
derstanding: Which timescales, gains, and gradients matter most in these
feedback circuits? What are the circuits’ phase-plot contours encompassing
regions of homeostasis, runaway amplification, and saddle points? Need
there be a gradient of palatability in the environment to induce these ef-
fects, or are other deviations from evolutionary statistics sufficient? Most
critical, under what circumstances can circuits hard-wired by nature to pur-
sue fast-resolving signals ever avoid falling into feedback traps? With such
an understanding, we may approach a theoretical consensus on the mathe-
matical drivers of addiction in general.
Simple homeostatic control provides an impoverished model of in-
strumentally conditioned behavior. In control, motor output is directly
driven by a scalar input, while behavior can be decoupled from input by
aversive signals or supervisory regulation. Nonetheless, our model can
approximately be mapped to instrumental conditioning. As Rossi and Yin
(2012) described, instrumental conditioning is a training process for gener-
ating and assessing the behavior of animals, often mice. They distinguish
between goal-directed and habitual behaviors. Goal-directed behavior re-
quires less training than habitual behavior and is more sensitive to “value
and contingency manipulations” than habitual behavior. For example, in-
strumental conditioning can be used to trainmice to associate lever pressing
with the “reward” of food pellets. If sustained for long enough, random in-
terval training, which introduces uncertainty in the process, can make the
association between the stimulus (the lever) and the reward (food) “habit-
ual,” and therefore difficult to extinguish. Moreover, a mouse that has a
“habit” of pressing the lever will continue to do so even after it has gone
through a reward devaluation procedure. Morrison, Bamkole, and Nicola
(2015) found that sign tracking behavior in mice—that is, the propensity to
engage with the conditioned stimulus (in this case the lever) rather than
the site of the reward—was “enhanced, rather than diminished, following
reward devaluation.”
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Our model accounts for this behavior in terms of timescale by treating
the conditioned stimulus as a variety of leading indicator. From the per-
spective of the simple control circuit, the leading indicator is not just faster,
but also assumed to be authoritative. It replaces the reward signal itself in
the name of efficiency. However, without having both separate variables,
reversing the initial association is computationally impossible. Thus, if the
circuit “knows” a reward is coming thanks to the leading indicator but that
reward fails to appear, the circuit has no reference to identify the source of
failure.
6.6 Leading-Indicator Dependency in Enriched Environments. These
same fast/slow trade-offs affect self-calibration. Calibration is vastly more
complex than single-variable foraging, involving multiple sensory modali-
ties (sight, sound, touch), multidimensional inputs, complex environments,
sequenced behaviors, and competing informational needs across space,
time, signal intensity, coherence, and so on. Fortunately, multidimensional
systems can still use homeostatis. As Koob and LeMoal (1997) explain, “The
concept of homeostatis contends that an organism maintains equilibrium
in all of its systems, including the brain reward system, that is, the or-
ganism uses physiological and cognitive or behavioral capabilities to func-
tion within the appropriate limits of physiology with the help of its own
resources.”
More important than the true complexity of the homeostatic system for
understanding self-calibration as information foraging is the fact that while
calories simply exist, information exist only through change in time, so a
self-calibrating system would not only forage for signals it finds palatable
(fast- versus slow-resolving sources) but would also for the sake of band-
width have an innate preference for fast-resolving, high-bandwidth signals
and the capacity to trigger them with its outputs. Such a temporally self-
modulating circuit is beyond our simple theory here.
6.6.1 Model and Principles. To model self-calibration as information for-
aging, we appeal to Figure 4, which caricatured the process of calibration
as a navigation toward subtler signals in search of greater model resolu-
tion. The motivating principle of calibration—and the statistical contract
protecting homeostatic self-calibration from homeostatic fragility—is that
fast-resolving, clean signals improve model resolution and thus constitute
a leading indicator worth pursuing. Figure 11 represents a thought exper-
iment designed to illustrate how self-calibrating systems could suffer from
leading indicator addiction in that pursuit. The figure represents a toy
environment with only two types of informational resources: fast-resolving
signals (e.g., clean ones) and slow-resolving signals (i.e., noisy). The fast
signals are like sugar, easy and quick to measure but not exactly what
the forager needs, while noisy signals take time to resolve. In a natural
environment, we suppose that these two high-amplitude signals occur
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Figure 11: Modern environments are enriched with fast-resolving data, and
hence likely to induce leading indicator dependency. In this graph, with the
same form as Figure 4, varieties of slow-resolving sensory data and their social
and environmental contexts are found on the lower right. On the upper left are
varieties of quick-resolving (enriched) data. These data are often available in
technologically influenced contexts; they are attractive to conscious drives but
provide little long-term benefit in terms of model resolution. Indulging in them
leads to an unconscious sense of decalibration, leading the homeostatic self-
calibration circuit to seek yet quicker, cleaner input, fruitlessly course-correcting
as in the runaway calorie/fiber dynamic.
simultaneously, so that looking for clean signals also provides noisy ones.
In that equivalence “clean= calories” and “noisy= fiber,” exactly as shown
in Figure 11. In a natural, neutral environment of rare fast-resolving signals,
this foraging strategy would succeed. But in an enriched environment, any
deficit in model resolution will press the forager toward even stronger,
quicker, less unambiguous signal sources, even if the problem results from
too many of them already.
7 A Note on Physical Media and Alternate Realities
Why didn’t novels and television produce the leading indicator depen-
dency we describe here? After all, they too are physical media transmitting
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2D, coherence-enriched, recorded information. Like the Internet, they allow
users to escape into alternate realities that are more structured than the real
world due to the statistical requirements of legibility. As low-entropy rep-
resentations, the stories transmitted by these media pose similar problems
to human sense making. The power of narrative representations to impair
one’s ability to understand the real world and find satisfaction in every-
day life has been explored by individuals as various as Socrates, Cervantes,
Austen, and Joseph Gordon Levitt. By reducing natural variation to more
quickly legible patterns of variation, narrative representations beguile our
senses as we engage with them and possess the power to change how (or
if) we notice natural variations and complexity moving forward. Once you
have encountered enough fictional “bad guys,” you might think they actu-
ally exist.
It is important, however, to emphasize that the problems posed by low-
entropy representations (the form of recorded information that concerns us
here) that we describe have more to do with the extent to which they sub-
stitute for live sources of information than with their low-entropy nature
in and of itself. We predict that were novels and television to provide sig-
nificant portions of an individual’s informational diet, they could lead to
leading indicator dependency or addiction. Moreover, we predict that such
a state would correlate with degradation in a brain’s model resolution and
psychosocial effects similar to those we associate with Internet addiction.
An extraordinary study from the 1970s in which researchers were able to
measure how newly gained access to television changed the inhabitants
of a remote Canadian town suggests that excessive TV watching impairs
problem solving, perseverance, and the ability to tolerate unstructured time
(Kubey&Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). It is estimated that 5% to 10% of the pop-
ulation suffers from television dependence (Sussman & Moran, 2013).
Novels, television, and the Internet are different, of course. Neither the
novel nor television offers the same levels of interactivity, customization, or
sense of place as the Internet, nor can novels or television conceal as deftly
as the Internet the seams that reveal theirfictionality. Advanced digital tech-
nology such as real time face capture and realistic digital avatars allows
content creators to take to new levels the strategies of stylized, selective
representation that make narrative representation possible. The Internet is
the playground of an army of professional entropy reducers, all doingwhat
they can for their own reasons to further simplify and compress the outputs
of the others, creating ever newermashups from evermore caricatured rep-
resentations of lived experience.
As a physical medium, the power of the Internet to re-present reality in
ways that beguile us inheres in its protean nature. Functionally, it is made
of computers, fiber-optic and copper cables, and code. Physically, it ap-
pears to most people as a piece of glass in front of their faces. Whereas a
codex or a television remains fairly fixed perceptually no matter the sym-
bolic form (i.e., content) they display, the Internet (as opposed to a laptop
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screen, for instance) can change how it appears to users to suit a symbolic
form. It may deliver the same symbolic forms one might encounter in a
codex or a television set, say, a novel, film, or television program. Or it
may deliver symbolic forms that were made especially for it—for example,
social media feeds, blogs, video games, animated content visualizations,
memes, podcasts, slide-share presentations, customer reviews. It can dis-
play text, still images, and moving images in various combinations. It can
transmit sounds, both natural and artificial. In the future, it is likely to be-
come evenmore protean. It solicits and responds to feedback inways and at
speeds that novels and televisions cannot, and does so with an agenda en-
forced by algorithmic intelligence. Our sensory systems are ill equipped to
deal with a single “object” capable of responsively playing such disjointed
roles. Novels and television offer attractive respites from reality. The In-
ternet offers to replace reality with whatever we find desirable in a given
moment.
What about stereoscopic virtual reality (VR) displays? Such displays al-
low a person to interact with a three-dimensional computer-generated rep-
resentation (Cummings & Bailenson, 2016). The illusion of depth provided
by VR would seem to be the solution to the problems we describe here.
However, while VR can provide a sense of “presence”—“the subjective ex-
perience of being in one place or environment, even when one is physically
situated in another” (Witmer & Singer, 1998)—this realism makes people
sick. “Simulator sickness” or “cybersickness” as it is known, is thought
to be due to “various stimuli, including linear oscillations at 0.2Hz, vec-
tion, visual distortion, flicker, conflict among oculomotor systems, and cue
asynchrony” (Kennedy, Lane, Berbaum,&Lilienthal, 1993). Those problems
were noticed decades ago and persist in spite of technological progress. It
is unlikely that VR will become addictive, since users cannot tolerate it in
the doses needed to trigger homeostatic fragility.
We do expect VR to become an important part of the 21st-century work-
place, particularly as a tool for managing geographically dispersed teams,
as with telepresence. Being 3D and immersive, VR has the potential to be
richer than older communications technologies. Although our metrics are
more refined than those used in media richness theory, we arrive at the
same conclusion: richer media reduce uncertainty and equivocation more
efficiently than less rich media. “Face-to-face is the richest medium,” ex-
plain Richard Daft and Robert Lengel (1986), “because it provides imme-
diate feedback so that interpretation can be checked.” Daft and Lengel
characterize richer media as using multiple channels and allowing for free
expression and fast feedback. Our more refined metrics could be used not
simply to match communications media to communicative task, but also to
design VRwith greater presence. Meetings held in a VR environment could
benefit from the medium’s ability to transmit nonverbal channels of com-
munication, especially if those channels weremodeledwith spatiotemporal
fidelity rather than as categories like “head and torso movements” (Hale
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& Hamilton, 2016). It might be tempting to capture and algorithmically
distill those cues as a visible bar or heat map, but such a process would
suffer serious information losses during both encoding and decoding.
8 Research Directions
The twomost radical aspects of this theoretical framework are its treatment
of dysfunctional-internet use patterns as a normal, nearly inevitable reac-
tion to statistically altered environments and its reliance on sound theoret-
ical principles over uncertain data. Both aspects can aid in constructing a
research framework of comparable reach. The key question to address in
human-digital interaction is how we humans react when the structure of
our social interaction is no longer arranged by our instincts but by the com-
municative needs of some intervening medium, and no longer arranged
according to our interests, but according to its interests.
We begin with a few general suggestions, and end with testable
hypotheses.
8.1 A Generalized Ecological Research Framework. A framework for
clinical research ought to provide a common, generalized platform with
which different disciplines can communicate to study diverse effects in
common terms. We recommend what is usually called an ecological ap-
proach, which examines how the environment affects perception, action,
and cognition. Central to such an ecological approach in the case of dysfunc-
tional use of interactive digital technology is the concept of informational
diets. The informational diet concept could unify the multiple categories of
digital use and abuse into a few simple parameters, and thereby promote
the “cumulative function of research” needed for progress in Internet ad-
diction (Tokunaga & Rains, 2016).
8.2 Human-Centered Theoretical Metrics
8.2.1 Existing Metrics. Media richness theory, as developed by Richard
Daft and Robert Lengel (1986), explains how organizational structure can
facilitate organizational information processing by ensuring effective com-
munication between relevant parties and emphasizes the speedwith which
richmedia reduce equivocation. Though the theory is still widely applied, it
was developed before many of the communications technology commonly
used in workplaces now. Moreover, the theory does not adequately take
into account the ways in which media can be configured to increase or re-
duce richness (Dennis &Valacich, 1999). Ourmetrics could be used to refine
and update this theory in terms of bandwidth, latency, and neuromechani-
cal trust and may explain why workplace restrictions on e-mail can reduce
stress and increase productivity (Mark, Voida, & Cardello, 2012).
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8.2.2 Theoretical Principles for Metrics. Or course, data must be measured
on limited schedules and budgets, putting a premium on cost and ease of
measurement. But the historical success of physical and evolutionary law
derives from concepts grounded in mathematical necessity, not in exper-
imental ease. The solution is a common set of principles, perhaps mas-
querading as quantitative metrics, that appeal only to first principles and
uncontested scientific fact, akin to the conservation laws of physics. This is
the language not of experiment but of universal law. In culling concepts,
even more crucial than excluding experimental categories is excluding so-
cial (as opposed to biological) measures of dysfunction. A truly human-
centered framework must measure only health, unsullied by complications
of legal punishment or economic reward.
As physicists have long boasted, universal laws are continuous and
parameterized by very few dimensions (Feynman, 1965). The most suc-
cessful big data projects exploit this fact by projecting high-dimensional
discrete data, such as online click streams, onto low-dimensional curves
(author W.S. has supervised several such commercial projects, whose de-
tails remain proprietary). In this view, collapsing the dizzying array of
human-digital interactions onto a few key axes is in fact the only possi-
ble way to make sense of the disparate data documenting informational
malnutrition.
While mathematically essential, such a truly continuous understanding
of human informational needs renders unstable categorical concepts such
as “dysfunction,” “addiction,” and even “diagnosis.” We claim such cate-
gories do not in fact describe reality anyway, operatingmore as triage filters
selecting where to spend resources. Researchers must take care not to con-
found categories imposed by convenience with measures of reality.
8.2.3 Neuromechanical Trust as the Ur-Principle of Sensory Metrics. We
claim that the dominant mechanism of trust formation is equivalent to the
mechanisms underlying the implicit trust in one’s senses and one’s balance.
Such concepts are definable (if not already defined) in terms of stability
zones and timescales and can be measured biophysically, so we need only
point out a few consequences.
First, as proposed above, one can construct theoretically sound sensori-
motor metrics, much like the metrics we propose valuing bandwidth, un-
fractured data, and precise timing. Second, one can rank the degree of trust
a mind has in anything in direct proportion to the quality of its assump-
tions and the quantity of its accumulated data, so comparing trust in (say)
a video image versus a live face ought to be straightforward. Third and
most crucial, this principle when applied to human communication means
that unconscious, nonverbal signals between people carry the vast major-
ity of social meta-data underlying trust, and carry the bulk of emotional
communication.
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8.3 Four Testable Hypotheses. Our framework “predicts” many well-
known facts: that walks in nature produce good moods, that people
trust face-to-face conversation more than remote, that full-range motion
is healthier than sitting sedentary. Such a continuous framework could of
course divide its novel predictions in countless ways. We choose four gen-
eral and testable hypotheses to show its scale and promise:
1. Informational nourishment. Human trust is maximized by
distraction-free, long-duration interaction in natural multisensory
3D environments and degrades proportionally as those constraints
are violated. We hypothesize that sensorimotor reintegration, if in-
troduced incrementally, will provide the most effective recalibration
for digitally impacted individuals.
2. Resonant connection. The best continuous approximation to human
interaction is not bilateral communication but vibratory connection,
as between coupled clocks or tuning forks. This generalized reso-
nance would appear as a statistical correlation between multiscale,
multidimensional, multifrequency attractor states (themselves com-
posed of actively controlled superpositions of the classical mechan-
ical eigenmodes of a solid body of minutely variable elasticity). We
hypothesize that under ideal conditions, the microscopic interaction
between two humans in proximity or contact will show traces of res-
onance and that interpersonal trust will correlate with its amplitude,
duration, and salience For example, we predict that a mother’s digi-
tal displacement during nursing will disrupt resonance and increase
the baby’s social anxiety.
3. Proximity connection. Under ideal conditions, the interactive trust
between two people varies with their exchange of information, sen-
sitive to both signal and noise. Among other things, this relation de-
creases with signal strength, and thus with distance, just like gravity
or electrostatic force. The farther apart, the weaker the connection
is. This hypothesis could be tested (say) by varying physical param-
eters (chair separation, lighting, air-conditioning noise, devices) in
live meetings, or by comparing live interaction with teleconferences
having various video and audio fidelities or latencies, for example.
4. Neuromuscular healing. All sensation, emotion, and cognition are
built from neuromechanical interactions, and “stuck states” are built
frommicroscopic neuromuscular spasms.We expect that local paral-
ysis (e.g., Botox) therapies that dislodge facial spasms and emotions
in fact work everywhere in the body. We predict the most effective
therapies will involve training a body’s most central, low-latency
neuromuscular interactions: the proprioception and kinesthetics of
spinal dexterity, balance, and vision, with particular emphasis on
the midline core. We predict that after myofascial and kinesthetic
training, mechanical improvements such as range (e.g., degrees
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of freedom, tracking precision, self-awareness) and grace (coher-
ence, mechanical efficiency) will correlate with emotional and self-
regulatory improvements.
9 General Discussion
We set out to answer two questions: Do informational diets matter? If so,
how? We discovered that for deep mathematical reasons, live information
streams are necessary to brain function.
Live information originates from 3-space and the people and things
within it. Its interface is air. No matter their content, live sources are three-
dimensional and constantly changing. Recorded information must be tem-
porarily frozen for preservation or transmission. Such freezing violates the
brain’s statistical contract with nature. Furthermore, restoration of digitized
signals necessarily mimics the appearance of continuity (as novels, televi-
sion, and film can) by smoothing away compression errors, as our brains
also do. No representation could ever preserve live information’s raw den-
sity, and no transmission or interface could avoid interference. Interactive
artificial representations further increase the sense of realism and presence,
but thereby push quantization damage further into the unconscious, where
it is harder to detect. For these and other reasons, we believe digital inter-
activity is incompatible with human sensory processing circuitry and dam-
ages social trust. This unorthodox claim could be refuted, for example, if
experimental subjects (people or animals) emerge from multiday immer-
sion in virtual reality undamaged.
Beyond the obvious inadequacies of digital sensorimotor data, we also
find that their coherence- and discontinuity-enriched statistical structure
can be potentially addicting to creatures evolved to process amore neutrally
structured diet. Using foraging theory and control theory, we show how
the natively stable, homeostatic feedback loop of a simple control circuit
foraging for resources (informational or otherwise) could reverse its sign
if the statistical distribution of the resources is enriched in attractiveness.
In that case, as with addiction, pursuing short-term appetites exacerbates
long-term needs.
This failure mode of leading-indicator dependency, when applied to se-
lected, enriched information on the Internet, can drive our low-level in-
formational appetites to consume ever more coherence-enriched stimuli in
a doomed attempt to resolve the calibration problems posed by consum-
ing too much in the first place. Such a decalibrated individual would dis-
play not only self-reinforcing consumption behavior but also well-known
symptoms of Internet addiction or starvation (Baker & Kermidas, 2013)
such as anxiety, irritability, depression, fatigue, and preoccupation with
the stimulus. In short, informational malnutrition leads to informational
starvation.
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Ourmodel of informational addictions is very similar to the impulse con-
trol model of Internet addiction, in which the Internet is viewed as a way
to escape and felt as a source of instant gratification. Tolerance develops, as
does withdrawal. The individual continues to overuse the Internet, despite
awareness of long-term damage and despite efforts to reduce. Our model
differs by locating the damage simply in the ratio of times spent online and
offline.
We reject the category of “addict” as we reject all categorical represen-
tations. We prefer a continuous spectrum describing Internet decalibration.
In its severe form, decalibration is a serious impulse control disorder whose
prevalence rate is likely to increase as online “life” becomesmore culturally
acceptable. As with decalibration’s intensity, its endurance must also lie on
a spectrum, dependent on toomany variables to count and in contradicting
ways. Pressure at work, for example, might lead to online stress relief, or
might remove the time for it. Damage to a relationship might provoke on-
line recriminations, or provide impetus for interpersonal change. In general
we predict that those who have ready access to supportive real-life interac-
tions and diversely appealing multisensory environments, especially those
motivated to change, will fare far better than those who do not.
To be sure, the Internet is not going away. It has certainly increased short-
term productivity. Unfortunately, we have identified short-term feedback
as problematic, and we have identified productivity as related to entropy
reduction, which is the root of the problem. In economics as with software
products, the largest efficiencies result from standardization, modulariza-
tion, scale, branding, and optimization, all of which are mechanisms of
entropy reduction. No wonder modern environments are so low entropy:
natural variability has been straightened and smoothed intoflat asphalt and
clean desks, replaced by the unnaturally attractive variability of flashing
billboards and flickering pixels.
To us, modernity’s crucial distinction is that its most attention-getting
features were designed to get attention, from skyscrapers to smartphones.
Digital media, for example, have been economically optimized for short-
term transmission, responsiveness, and attractiveness at the expense of fi-
delity. Digital media succeed by appealing to high-level recognition at the
expense of the sub-millimeter, sub-millisecond detail that is so expensive
to transmit. What is signal to our bodies is noise to a digital encoder. This
matters because such detail carries the vast majority of sensory bandwidth
necessary for interpersonal calibration and trust. Digital media succeed be-
cause they operate so fast and far, delivering long-range, short-term social
hits but failing to deliver long-term trust.
Internet addiction is a complex, fast-evolving problem affecting prac-
tically everyone on earth; of course it is hard to study with experimen-
tal methods. Our model of Internet addiction, however, is both theoretical
and highly simplified, features we regard as virtues. The sensory metrics
we propose are commonplace yet yield orders-of-magnitude differences in
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information density. The sheer size of the difference renders precise num-
bers unnecessary, and its decade-scale acceleration suggests the Internet
may be the straw that breaks the camel’s back. Human environments
have gradually enriched in attractive, low-entropy patterns since the first
cave paintings and now, through the Internet, can dominate our sensory
diets.
A natural instinct is to believe that humans can adapt to digital environ-
ments as we have to every natural environment on earth. But the Internet is
neither natural nor on earth. It is not a source of informational nutrition but
rather a source of informational lures and camouflage. There is no reason to
think the humanmind can adapt to a purely symbolicworld aswell as it can
to forests and deserts or that younger generations benefit from childhood
sensory fracturing.
Our hominid ancestors evolved millions of years ago to sense and com-
municate without technology or even words (which arrived only 50,000
years ago). Now even live words are ever more quickly being replaced
by text communication thanks to a well-known dynamic called “network
effects.” The fact that social time is ultimately limited means that increas-
ing time spent looking at screens decreases time spent looking at faces (see
Figure 12).
Whatever their current flaws, digital media could improve in ways sug-
gested by our metrics: reduce latency, jitter, and interruptions; increase
bandwidth; and employ compression algorithms that do not privilege
conscious recognition over unconscious feelings. We imagine a Web 3.0
that caters to rather than insults human sensory needs, organizations that
encourage high-bandwidth interaction, and individuals who seek it for
themselves.
This framework suggests that one key to healthy life with digital tech-
nology is systematic exposure to high-entropy natural stimuli. For example,
the Japanese nature meditation of Shinrinyoku (aka forest bathing) has been
shown to reduce stress, anxiety, depression, and anger (see the summary
in Li, 2010; Tsunetsugu, Park, & Miyazaki, 2010). Other high-entropy treat-
ments include proximity training (co-breathing, eye gazing), touch therapy
with people or animals (Kaminski, Pellino, & Wish, 2002), and practices
building neuromechanical trust (contact dance, partner sports). Following
their own advice, we have invested in and benefited from related practices:
autonomous motion (Ecstatic Dance), vibratory meditation (“Mindful Res-
onance”), and Mysore yoga.
We predict that neuromuscular interventions will succeed because the
computational infrastructure of the human nervous system is more neu-
romuscular than cognitive. The most central, salient, high-bandwidth, and
mission-critical signals in a body are internal: proprioception, kinesthesia,
balance, posture, and locomotion. Next to those, even the visual and cog-
nitive systems are but subsystems of head and gaze control. As a general
principle, improving underlying muscular control produces cognitive and
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Figure 12: Growth dynamics of screen use. (A) The fact that social time is ul-
timately limited means that increasing time spent looking at screens decreases
time spent looking at faces. (B) Because one’s comfort with any medium in-
creases (or decreases) with exposure and practice, there will be a tipping point
at which screen use is preferred (about 6% of people worldwide now meet this
standard). (C) While at first the decrease in face-reading skills is governed by
individual appetites for screens, a sufficiently large screen-only population will
deplete the face-reading population, leading to an additional decline in oppor-
tunity to see faces. These dynamics are mathematically neutral because they
describe the general principles underlying progressive adoption of any com-
munications medium, not just screens and faces.
emotional benefits, as with eye-movement therapy (Shapiro & Laliotis,
2010).
Of all muscular systems, the most therapeutically promising is the most
ancient one: the million-year-old spinal and breathing circuits underlying
vertebrate identity. Massive anecdotal evidence indicates that spine-related
practices such as dance, chiropractic care, and yoga routinely reverse
lifelong muscular miswirings. Furthermore, the subtle pleasures of mov-
ing one’s body through extremes of position and exertion are healthy be-
cause, as a general principle, all bodies evolved to meet their long-term
needs through natural pleasures.
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Like all other nervous systems, ours evolved to forage, not produce. Hu-
mankind uniquely produces things that captivate our senses, and now they
do.
Appendix: Framework Overview
This appendix explains and justifies our framework’s concepts in quantita-
tive terms. We occasionally repeat introductory remarks from the text for
context.
A.1 Continuous versus Categorical Representations. Perception and
learning in traditional neuroscience usually refer to categorical distinctions,
such as object types, decisions, or behaviors—for example, differentiating
friend from foe via assorted cues such as expression, vocalization, and
gait. But a brain’s twin tasks of millisecond muscular coordination and
representing continuous reality require vastly more and better structured
information than categories could ever provide. Here our computational,
information-theoretic approach diverges from traditional neuroscience.
In our view, while categories can transport sensory information, they
are bad at representing it because the natural world is continuous. Truly
natural categories are few: the elementary particles and forces, atomic ele-
ments, and the states of matter. Typically, specific arrangements of matter
follow statistical distributions instead; even friend versus foe is less a cat-
egory than a heuristic to simplify ongoing, multidimensional responses to
multidimensional inputs. Furthermore, quantized categories and decisions,
shorn of raw detail, poorly approximate continuous 3D reality (a yes/no
decision carries only a single bit, and one-of-many distinctions carry only a
few bits).
Using continuous representation as a guiding principle makes some tra-
ditional measures unavailable. For example, human communicationwould
be reduced to continuous bidirectional vibratory signals, more like sonic
resonances than words. Words emerged only recently in evolutionary his-
tory. Doubtless among all that hominid humming and trembling, our non-
verbal ancestors would have scattered proto-words and proto-gestures, but
in bandwidth terms, that symbolic information content would have been
only a filament within the continuous, semicoherent, multichannel carrier
wave connecting two vibrating humans. In this continuous analysis, exper-
imental measures like decisions, thresholds, and fixed-response question-
naires also have little place.
Even apparent natural discontinuities such as lightning and volcanic
eruptions result from instabilities in continuous dynamical equations; so
do electronic discontinuities like logic transitions, but far faster and more
invisibly.
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A.2 The Unconscious. It is beyond doubt that the vast portion of sen-
sory and sensorimotor processing is inaccessible to conscious recollection,
for twomain reasons. The first computational limit on consciousness is hor-
rific undersampling: sensory neurons feed the brain information a million
times faster than it can store it. (For an accessible overviewof the research on
unconscious processing, see Mlodinow, 2015.) More crucial is that sensory
awareness itself must operate unconsciously to be effective. Neuroscientists
for years havemarveled at the deftness bywhich the visual systemhides the
retina’s blind spot from awareness, but they seldom note that as a general
principle, such cloaking is a computational necessity for a representation to
operate as quickly and efficiently as possible (Softky, 2014). Consciousness,
like self-auditing, is usually a waste of computational resources.
Consciousness (whichwe do notmodel) is related to attention (whichwe
do). The part of attentionwe are conscious of is the goal-directed attentional
system, but there is a stimulus-driven attentional system as well (Eysenck,
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), which operates below the conscious
threshold. When the unconscious stimulus-driven system dominates, con-
scious attentional control decreases. We show that this unconscious atten-
tional appetite is biased toward consuming low-noise “clean” stimuli, and
we show the conditions under which too many clean stimuli can trigger
avoidance of high-noise stimuli leading to compulsive Internet use. Unfor-
tunately, digital media have evolved to please the conscious mind, so by
construction we will not sense the unconscious damage they produce.
A.3 Compression andDecompressionOccur inStages. Thosewho fre-
quently use digital devices are already familiar with the central concepts
underlying compression, in particular encoding, transmission, and decod-
ing of streamed images, as shown in Figure 2.
Take a familiar video camera, for example, and its several information-
processing stages. First, the lens focuses a continuous two-dimensional
sheet of light on sensors of the camera’s focal plane, where in the process
called encoding or compressing, light intensity becomes recorded as fixed,
quantized values at fixed, quantized locations. Those bits in one form or
another are stored and transmitted to a screen, where decoding or decom-
pressing circuits interpolate them to conjure approximations of the smooth
surfaces, straight edges, and continuous motion which were present in the
original sheet of light. That reconstituted model drives yet another quan-
tization step, flashing discrete pixels on a screen. When our eyes see those
pixels, our visual system performs its own decompression, conjuring in our
minds a sharp, glitch-free impression of the original scene based on that
smattering of flickering dots.
All of this can be understood as the flow of Shannon information along
a bandwidth channel connecting encoder and decoder, a process clearly
more complex than mere bandwidth. It has several stages, as shown in
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Figure 2. An encoding circuit must validate the format of its input data
(stage 1) and set themeta-data about encoding context (stage 2), filter (stage
4), quantize (stage 5), and then, during decoding, validate the received
quanta (stage 6) and adjust dequantization filters based on separately de-
coded context meta-data (stage 7), before inverse filtering (stage 8) and de-
quantizing (stage 9).
A signal can be called deceptive if it has been specifically encoded (in vi-
olation of that assumption) to exploit an adversary’s hard-wired decoding
assumptions of neutrality. For example, the high-contrast visual contours
found in camouflage, or lures, exploit a viewer’s automatic, low-level as-
sumption that high-contrast contours correspond to object borders. In this
scheme the middle stages, 3 to 7, correspond to information compression
as it is understood for images, videos, and so on, while the outermost steps
deal with meta-data. The middle data encoding and decoding stages are in
fact the only ones implemented in systems optimized for efficiency; self-
auditing and incorporating meta-data such as context slow things down
and are thus omitted. For example, in the natural world a visual system
would be optimized to process sensorimotor data directly, assuming for
convenience and speed that all of its sensorimotor input in fact originated
from 4D space-time. In a natural sensory channel, signal trust is necessary,
fast, implicit, and preconscious.
A.4 Bandwidth. The quality of a representation depends on its infor-
mation content or rate in bytes per second, so sensory bandwidth limits the
quality of sensory representations. The lowest bandwidth senses are smell
and taste because they change so slowly; we leave them out of our analysis.
In descending bandwidth order, our top three channels are touch, vision,
and sound. Estimates of bandwidth for those senses depend onwhether the
neural spikes are treated separately in a pulse code, or averaged together
in a rate code, as shown in Table 1.
A.5 Noise. Variability in nature is noisy and random and can be aver-
aged into better signals. Variability in the digital world was sculpted just
for us; the structure of its variability either takes advantage of or prevents
our signal-averaging abilities.
Before discussing signals, we should discuss noise. Noise in nature is
abundant, and simple. At the very finest scale, photons and phonons are
independent and random (Poisson shot noise). This means that the central
limit theorem (aka law of averages) applies, so averaging provides a good
estimate of the original source. Furthermore, statistically significant devi-
ations from uniformity correspond to real deviations in source structure.
This is the usual case for scientific data gathering.
But variability in the digital world has a very different structure from
the “noise” known to science. In one sense, digital variability is lower,
having been specifically enriched to appear to our sensory systems as
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Table 1: Approximate Bandwidths of Human Sensory Input.
Spikes/
Source Fibers Sec/Fiber Bits/Spike BW (bits/sec)
Optic nerve
Pulse code 1,000,000 1 10 @ 1 msec pulse 10 Mbit
Rate code 1 0.15 @ N = 10 rate 150 kbit
Myo-fascial network
Pulse 1,000,000 1 13 @ 0.1 msec pulse 13 Mbit
Rate 0.15 @ N = 10 rate 45 kbit
Cochlear nerve
Pulse 30,000 10 13 @ 0.1 msec pulse 4 Mbit
Rate 10 0.15 @ N = 10 rate 45 kbit
Nyquist 10 kbit @ 20 kHz
coherent 3D images or sounds rather than as random snow or hiss. In that
sense, moment-to-moment digital inputs are designed to seem low noise
and clean. But digital sources are hyperdimensional patterns, which (unlike
real things) can change discontinuously, thereby violating the continuous
natural laws a nervous system expects. The unnatural structure of digital
variability can make it appear far more trustworthy and predictable than it
actually is.
“Noise” in neural signals is problematic as well. Neural signals are com-
posed of pulses (action potentials), whose timing seems roughly random
(“Poisson”). As shown in Table 1, one can either average those pulses (the
usual neuroscientific “rate code”) or treat them as precise binary messages
(“pulse code”) (Softky, 1995). The difference amounts to a factor of 100 in
information content.
A.6 Signal Formals andMetrics. Table 2 quantifies the sensory metrics
contained in Figure 3.
A.7 Media and Interface Distortions. An interface lies between the
organic sensorimotor system and the calibration field. Originally that in-
terface was air. Air is neutral and consistent, transmitting signals with
maximum fidelity along each of the eight metrics of Figure 3. Relative to
it, digital communications are corrupted in many ways—in particular, de-
creased bandwidth, lower temporal fidelity, and more interruptions.
One can understand digital communications technologies like those of
Figures 1 and 2 in terms of those interface metrics and can thus quantify
artificial social communication alongside natural communication. Figure 13
shows how four digital metrics crucial to social communication—
bandwidth, latency jitter, fracturing, and uninterrupted duration—all fare
orders of magnitude worse than natural ones.
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Table 2: Sensory Metrics of Trust.
Metric Units Worst Best Importance
1 Encoding
format
Yes/no No Yes Wrong format violates
protocol, allows
deception
2 Unfractured
sensory
pairings
[1/25,1.0] 1/25 1.0 Cross-sensory
inconsistencies
violate protocol,
mislearn correlations
3 Round-trip
latency
Sec Days Microseconds Fast round trip allows
quick iteration and
exploration
4 Latency jitter Sec Days Microseconds Consistently precise
timing allows
high-precision
correlations
5 Uninterrupted
duration
Sec Sec Years Long calibration runs
work best
6 Sensory
bandwidth
Bits/sec Bits/hour MB/sec Learning rate and
performance are
proportional to
bandwidth
7 Noise Fraction of
signal
≫signal 0 Noise reduces the
number and
bandwidth of
detectable signals
8 Unbiased input
fraction
0–100% 0% 100% Systematically biased
input at all threatens
calibration dynamics
and thus security
One major source of media distortion is the gap between apparent
and actual information transfer. The apparent information is given by
the resolution of the transducer (a display or speaker), which physical-
izes uncompressed information. The compressed information feeding that
representation is typically much smaller, as shown in Table 3.
A.7.1 Example: Latency Jitter Reduces Trust. Consider for the moment the
brain as a sensitive correlation detector, able to correlate output spikes with
subsequent input spikes over long times yet withmillisecond precision and
reliability resulting from the physical constancy of air’s sound-speed, of the
eyeball’s moment of inertia, of retinal cells’ response lag, of myofascial tis-
sue’s vibrational phase velocity, and so on. Such a brain would be sensi-
tive to millisecond-level discrepancies in return signals from any source. So
once a brain sends a message to an object, it keeps track of exactly when the
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Figure 13: Qualitymetrics of natural versus digital stimuli. Entropyflow (band-
width) goes down, and latency jitter (a measure of temporal uncertainty) gets
worse with digital communication. Uninterrupted duration also gets shorter
(same scale). Both effects span orders of magnitude. These graphs use the same
layout as Figure 14 in plotting a scalar dot-size according to bandwidth and la-
tency jitter, with the largest dots representing natural values. (A) Fracturing F
measures the number of cross-sensory pairs possible in the medium, relative to
the 25 pairs possible with five senses. (B) Uninterrupted duration "tdur mea-
sures the upper bound of time available without interruptions. Digital media
fare far worse than unimpeded access to the natural calibration field on all met-
rics, not just these two.
Table 3: Compressed and Uncompressed Bandwidths of Digital Devices.
Compressed Uncompressed
Information or Transducer Information
Message Bandwidth (bytes) or Bandwidth
Facebook “like” 1/8 (=1 bit) 1000 (= 1000 pixels)
1 character 1 1000
1 emoticon 3 1000
5-character string 5 5000
5-character string (autocorrected) 2 5000
162 character text 162 16200
200 word e-mail 1000 200 kB
Poor mobile call 1 kb/sec 5 kb/sec
Good landline call 5 kb/sec 5 kb/sec
Skype 100 kb/sec 10 MB/sec
HDTV 1 MB/sec 1 GB/sec
Telepresence 4 MB/sec 1 GB/sec
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return signal (echo) arrives and ascribes any variability not to the transmis-
sionmediumbut to uncertainty about the object itself, whether that “object”
is another person’s attention or one’s own leg. This is why the metric of la-
tency jitter is a good marker for neuromechanical trust, and hence for trust
in general.
Now consider what this means for digital communication. We suppose
two humans communicating in proximity exchange reciprocal timing sig-
nals with precise (i.e., millisecond) phase precision. And we suppose their
brains not only recognize but learn to rely on that high level of temporal
response fidelity, albeit unconsciously, as a marker of the reliability of the
other person, and hence as a marker of trust. By this measure, an exchange
of text messages lasting an hour on average (3.6 million msec) has made
each participant seem to the other to be millions-fold less trustworthy than
in real life, at least unconsciously. Even a better and more highly interac-
tive technology, the mobile phone, does not actually transmit millisecond-
level signals but instead synthesizes them and, additionally, introduces a
hundred-fold more jitter, becoming a hundred times less trustworthy than
real life. In both cases, the drop in trust is assigned instinctively not to the
medium but to the person at the other end.
A.8 Natural Statistics. The neuroscientific concept of natural statistics
distinguishes the fractal complexity of natural scenes from the simplified
structure of man-made cages and buildings; we explore this distinction in
depth in section 5.
Most stimuli in visual neuroscience were designed to elicit spikes, for
example, high-contrast shapes and gratings suddenly flashed on a screen
or symbols carrying fixed semantic content. Those stimuli produce such
strong neural responses precisely because they are unnatural.
By definition, the statistical profile of the natural world is “natural.” The
term natural statistics conventionally refers to the statistics of natural vi-
sual features, and we follow that tradition in assuming that the Bayesian
priors embedded in sensory systems are hard-wired for the statistics of
natural environments. But we disagree about measurement, which for ex-
perimental convenience has analyzed images of nature, that is, 2D freeze-
framed pixelated projections (Ruderman & Bialek, 1994), rather than the
ever-changing continuous four-dimensional original sources, such as wav-
ing trees or swirls of smoke. The rich, multiscale detail of natural 4D envi-
ronments makes them distinct from hypersimplified environments such as
the rectilinear cages inwhich lab animals acquiremost of their sensorimotor
experience. While both natural and cage environments deliver continuous-
time 3D signals, their statistical profiles differ profoundly, with cage
environments missing crucial high-entropy signals. In effect, the same rea-
soning that makes nervous systems reared in cages suspect should also ap-
ply to nervous systems reared in buildings.
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A.8.1 Quantitative Comparison of Natural and Artificial Inputs. Compar-
ing bandwidth values across digital and natural environments requires a
thought experiment in which the same stimulus can be expressed in both
terms. We introduce the concept of a flatland video display: like a screen,
but a continuous-space, continuous-time, full-color, full brightness, full-
resolution image, like the real world in all respects but flat instead of 3D.
We make the equivalence by equating the information flow necessary to
drive such a display with the subset of sensory experience that perceives it.
Figure 14 illustrates the comparison.
Specifically, in a flatland display, a viewer sees not a monocular image
of a 3D person, but a binocular image of a 2D projection of the person. That
image would span only a small portion of a viewer’s visual field, and none
of her tactile or kinesthetic field. Furthermore, by being flat, it would carry
even less information. So in natural terms, such an image is information
poor. By circumventing natural depth cues from eye-vergence, binocular
disparity, and interaural timing difference, this flatland image would not
only fracture sensory experience; it would occupy only a small fraction of
the viewer’s 3D representational space and thus consume only a small frac-
tion of its native 3D sensory bandwidth.
While such flat images are suboptimal images for our senses, in techno-
logical terms they constitute an ideal, infinite-resolution telepresence dis-
play. So this hypothetical sub-lower-bound example of a seminatural cal-
ibration input would already exceed the upper bound of any imaginable
technology,making the bandwidth comparison approximate at best. But be-
cause we want to compare natural and artificial communications channels,
we can choose to equate the sensory bandwidth of “flatland” to the known
telepresence bandwidth of about 1 gigabyte per second. In this sense,
even telepresence counts as sensory deprivation. It is important to empha-
size that text-based channels carry yet a billion-fold less information than
telepresence.
A.9 Calibration as a Process. Instruments are calibrated by engineers
and scientists to maintain resolution, noise immunity, and robustness. But
strictly speaking, calibration applies less to the physical instrument than
to a model of its input/output relations. So in the broadest sense, the goal
of calibration is to produce a trustworthy model, operating over as wide a
range and with as small an error as possible. In this sense, a trustworthy
model would thus roughly maximize model trust, which we represented
relationally in Figure 4.
In other words, calibration activity is a form of data gathering designed
tomake the instrument’s behavior match its current resolution. Both follow
a process beginning with the initial creation of high-amplitude excursions
over a large volume of data space and followed by the slow reduction in
amplitude and speed as the model’s resolution improves. The better the
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model, the more subtle the signals it seeks, the longer it consumes them,
and the gentler its output perturbations.
This process is so familiar that it is seldomdiscussed, but the rough steps
and rationales of this approach bear repeating because they tightly con-
strain how self-calibration must proceed. The qualities of good calibration
data are familiar, but each calibration stage requires a different type of data.
We represent the relationship between calibration stage and data type in the
following list in order of decreasing output amplitude:
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1. Orient. In an interactive system like a sensorimotor system, sensory
inputs must respond to outputs before testing can begin. The system
must first orient itself by creating coherent, commensurate output
and input filters, as with rocking a radio dial to optimize a signal (a
process often called “locking in”).
2. Probe extremes of input and output. Before beginning data storage,
onemust knowat least the data’s approximate range, andhencemust
push signal amplitudes at least briefly to their limits.
3. Accumulate statistics of the interaction. Once a stable interaction is
established, the best calibration runs are the longest uninterrupted
ones with the widest output ranges, including no output at all (neu-
tral baseline). Not only are more data better as a general principle,
but uninterrupted data in particular avoid introducing uncertain-
ties regarding context switching, reestablishing lock, and reverifying
parameters.
Initially, to lock in a signal quickly and test extremes, it helps if the signal
is underambiguous (i.e., “clean”) in some domain, in the manner of a test
Figure 14: Natural patterns sorted by entropy and duration. (A) Spatial pat-
terns in the forest or savanna are ambiguous, complex, detailed, and diverse—
of high entropy. In that environment simple low-entropy patterns are rare and
often fleeting, but those provide the cleanest signals. (B) Man-made patterns
have been selected over time and, hence, contain more regularities than natural
ones. (C, D) Channels of nonverbal (continuous) and symbolic (quantized) com-
munication: (C)Mechanical vibrations of the body carry the highest-bandwidth
interpersonal communication signals, involving up to 100% of the sensorimotor
system (as in full body contact) down to very little (grazing touch). The horizon-
tal axis here shows one possible measure of sensory information quality, the
jittering in latency (equivalent to the signal’s temporal precision). In a natural
environment such latencies are effectively instant (except for sound speed) and
jitter free. As a thought experiment to compare natural with artificial inputs,
one can image a two-dimensional flatland image embedded in three dimen-
sions, which would occupy a tiny fraction of volumetric sensory input and thus
would carry far less bandwidth. (D) The same bandwidth analysis applies to
standardized communications like videos, phone calls, and text, with the cru-
cial proviso that none of those actually arrives in the continuous space-time
format a nervous system expects. The uncompressed bandwidth of those me-
dia depends on the transducer (e.g., screen) resolution, but their compressed
(i.e., true) bandwidth is consistent. To present vibratory and quantized com-
munication on the same axis, we equate the flatland image from above with an
ultra-high-quality telepresence interaction. This approach shows the impover-
ished form and quality (via lower entropy and higher latency jitter) of electronic
communications relative to natural ones.
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pattern: sharp contours, sudden transients, pure tones, or pure hues. Gen-
eralized edges and point sources are especially useful because they carry
information phase-locked across multiple scales. Successful signal locking
does not last long, but subsequent steps do, because more data always give
better statistics. Slowly accumulated signals should be natural (as opposed
to coherence enriched) and contain a representative amount of ambiguity
and noise. In summary, the general process of calibration usually moves
from brief, coherent, high-amplitude outputs and input to slow and subtle
ones, because calibration usually improves the resolution of the model. But
if the resolution somehow gets worse, proper calibration will reverse that
strategy, boosting output to get clean return signals.
A.10 Palatability. We assume informational organisms will seek to re-
calibrate by seeking clean, unambiguous signals in natural environments.
We map this appetite for clean sensory data to the concept of attractiveness
or “palatability.”
Artificial digital environments are enriched in overcoherent signals to
meet informational appetites. Butmuch like lures and living fish, artificially
attractive signals cannot satisfy an organism’s underlying needs. Digital
sensory data in particular fail to meet human needs because they do not
originate directly from the 4D space-time for which we evolved, but arrive
in an utterly different data format: they are two-dimensional, discontinuous
in space and time, anddelivered at lowbit rates (relative to physical proxim-
ity). A human consuming such quantized input, no matter how clean, will
remain hungry for the rich, continuous, 4D signals required by human sen-
sory processing circuitry. When the informational need for continuous 4D
signals remains unsatisfied, processing circuitry falls out of calibration, and
the accuracy level of the brain’s model of its world declines. In a doomed
effort to restore calibration, sensory processing circuitry may drive a hu-
man to seek the easily accessible yet unserviceable clean data provided by
digital environments.
A.11 Sign-Reversing Feedback Loops. When organisms operate out-
side the statistical environments in which they evolved, their expected
homeostatic balance can be upset, and stable negative feedback can be in-
verted into positive feedback in a situation called “sign reversal.”
Since the evolution of dopaminergic reward signals, organic circuits
have evolved to control various biological parameters such as nutrient in-
take, energy expenditure, salt concentration, and so on. These circuits are
what keep organisms in homeostasis as their environments change. Two
conditions allow such circuits to function even in the presence of sensor
and effector flaws, such as time lags, noise, and imperfect correlation with
the ground-truth biological need. First, homeostatic control is by construc-
tion self-correcting, so it should converge even with flaws in the sensors
and effectors. Second, such control succeeds by following concentration
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gradients through space, so trial-and-error tuning (i.e., evolution) is suf-
ficient to optimize the circuit parameters for any particular combination of
sensor properties and concentration statistics.
But as a general rule, circuits optimized by trial and error to operate in
one type of environment will fail, sometimes catastrophically, in environ-
mental structures they have not experienced. We examine concentration
gradients because they are the organism’s eyes; they show it where to go
and what to do, and their structure is embedded in the organism’s circuits
and parameters. If modern gradients point differently than evolutionary
ones do, not only does the original homeostatic contract no longer hold, but
now a highly sensitive automated vehicle is on the loose unsupervised, al-
lowed (or forced) to both forage and self-calibrate in completely uncharted
zones of data-space, using only old hard-wired habits but otherwise with-
out references. It is hard to conceive of any circuit that would not get stuck
or fail under such circumstances.
A.12 Evolutionary Pressures. The most general problem is that hu-
mans evolved to sense and communicate without artificial interference.
Only very recently in evolutionary time, at the “great leap forward” about
50,000 to 100,000 years ago, did physical artifacts such as tools and cave
paintings begin filling an ever-growing portion of the human calibration
field (Diamond, 1999). Unfortunately, the laws by which physical messages
propagate depend not only on human salience, but also on physical produc-
tivity, so over time, unproductive or antiproductive messages die out, bias-
ing the message pool away from human-centered distributions. This line of
reasoning poses several systematic tensions, and explains Internet addic-
tion as simply the latest and most potent calibration imbalance caused by
various representational technologies over history.
The first tension concerns conscious versus unconscious recognition:
digital inputs are optimized for conscious recognition. Yet we cannot de-
tect (much less correct for) problems at scales too fine or fleeting to no-
tice. The second tension concerns discomfort versus dynamic range: many
of the torments that civilized life avoids—thermal stress, hunger, violent
illness—can be considered in informational terms as unpleasant but neces-
sary calibration episodes. Third, the attention-harvesting industry exploits
the tension between short-term compulsion and the long-term mental ex-
ternalities it creates. The fourth tension concerns network effects: the more
people abandon our native face-to-face protocol in favor of convenient digi-
tal interactivity, the fewer live bodies remain for others to practice with (see
Figure 12). If left unchecked, this trend will ultimately make obsolete homo
sapiens’ native communications protocol.
Perhaps the deepest systematic tension is the tug of war between opti-
mization and autonomy, both of which are needed for establishing any kind
of trust. Like life itself, optimization is a form of entropy reduction. Evolu-
tion optimizes creatures by natural selection; evolution optimizes brains to
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perform efficient representation; a growing brain optimizes its own perfor-
mance through learning; and amature brain optimizes its balance and body
coordination using data in real time. Paradoxically, each entropy-reducing
optimization includes a step of injecting entropy, like autonomous choices
and random mutations.
Businesses also optimize: a business as a whole optimizes marginal rev-
enue, data science finds best-fit models, and websites iteratively improve
click counts by random A/B testing. Unfortunately, optimizing a business
goal often involves sculpting customer perceptions and behaviors, thereby
reducing the entropy of human behavior, choice, and autonomy. In short,
to calibrate our brains, we need autonomy; to submit it to organized opti-
mization, we must forgo it.
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 
 
A Neuroscientist and a Humanist Find Simple Solutions 
to “Internet Addiction” Using Math 
 
MENLO PARK, CA (August 31, 2017) –– Research in both the natural and social sciences 
finds that the more time people spend online the more likely they are to be lonely, depressed, and 
anxious. The nature of this relationship, however, remains poorly understood. To solve this 
mystery, theoretical neuroscientist William Softky and narrative theorist Criscillia Benford turn 
to the mathematical laws of information flow. Their paper, “Sensory Metrics of 
Neuromechanical Trust,” which appears in the September 2017 issue of the Journal of Neural 
Computation, uses these laws to model how sensorimotor information flows through the circuitry 
responsible for calibrating the brain’s internal representations of lived experience. This circuit-
level model demonstrates how recorded information (like digital data) negatively impacts the 
brain’s powers of prediction, causing humans to lose trust in their senses, themselves, their 
understanding of the world, and each other.  
 
Softky and Benford treat all incoming information––whether information from a wilting rose or 
information from the physical presence of a live, talking person or information from a text 
exchange or Instagram photo, etc. etc.––as training data for the brain. Training data originating 
from digital worlds negatively impacts human understanding and trust because it violates the 
brain’s hard-wired expectations regarding signal format, noise, and timing; it elevates vision at 
the expense of other senses; it contains less information (thanks to dominant compression 
practices and physical limits on bandwidth) than data originating from the “real” world; and it is 
systemically biased in ways that generate revenue. When posed in these terms, the problem of 
“internet addiction”––or as Softky and Benford prefer call it “leading indicator dependency”––is 
best solved through the systematic reintroduction of live training data originating from “woolly” 
physical environments like forests, and woolly social situations like face-to-face conversations 
on sensitive topics. 
 
Live training data from woolly places and situations might feel uncomfortable to process in the 
short term, but in the long term it makes people feel better, because such data is trust-bearing and 
ambiguous enough in just the right ways to re-calibrate a brain’s internal models. As Softky 
explains, “The human brain understands the trustworthiness of its models like a scientist 
understands the trustworthiness of calculations. Both brains and scientists assign ‘confidence 
intervals’ to every data point, which are shadow or mirror numbers that say how much to trust 
that data. For example, the brain assigns a high confidence interval to signals from deep inside 
our muscles. This is why we experience neuromechanical trust when our foot hits the ground. 
Neuromechanical trust isn’t inspired by ‘content,’ it arises from a separate channel carrying 
meta-data, a ‘trust channel.’ Our brains create trust from raw trust-bearing signals, which of 
themselves are high-bandwidth, unbiased, coherent sensory information from natural 3-D 
sources, with fast back-and-forth interactivity. Unlike recognizable ‘content,’ trust-bearing 
signals are processed below the threshold of consciousness. We don’t always notice when trust 
signals are missing, but the damage is very real.” 
 
The paper addresses the most common question asked of people who investigate so-called 
internet addiction: Won’t humans learn to handle the effects of digital technology on the brain? 
After all, as Benford points out, novels, TV, early video games and more inspired similar moral 
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panics. “Socrates worried that the written word would make people more forgetful, stupid, and 
boring. It’s easy to laugh. People adapt to the latest technology and the world wags on, right? 
That’s the standard refrain,” she says. “But consider this: our newest representational 
technologies are ubiquitous and necessary. They ‘think’ a million times faster than us, in 
microseconds instead of seconds, and they can relentlessly pursue our attention and our money 
with algorithmic intelligence. We’ve never been here before. Representational technologies have 
never before known so much about us, been so smartly integrated into daily life, so interactive, 
and so focused. The point is not that digital technology is de-facto evil. The point is that it can 
be––and must become––better tuned to our own needs as social beings with sensorimotor needs.” 
 
Benford and Softky hope the framework they’ve introduced will inspire “Web 3.0”––a wiser 
version of the internet that respects human sensorimotor needs––and facilitate the development 
of effective and accessible treatments for the psychosocial distress associated with problematic 
internet use. 
 
Their mathematical model of what happens to the brain when it consumes high quantities of 
training data originating from interactive digital technology yields clear advice for individuals 
who are looking to cut down on their internet use and avoid communications minefields: 
 
• Practice tolerating uncertainty by waiting to receive a definitive answer to your 
questions. When your physical safety is not at stake, give yourself the chance to feel the 
discomfort of being unsure. If you combine this practice with the practices described 
below, cravings for instant certainty will probably feel less intense. 
 
• Practice sensory integration by making time for whole-body sensorimotor experiences, 
ideally in “woolly” environments: hiking, yoga, swimming, dance, forest bathing, 
gardening. Autonomous activities, especially outside, provide the full-spectrum training 
data that fuels trust in your senses. Solo sensorimotor practice is especially useful for 
people overwhelmed by face-to-face interaction, because it facilitates sensorimotor re-
calibration without requiring social exposure. 
 
• Practice proximity communication without technological interference, ideally for an 
hour at a time, in “woolly” environments––e.g., community picnics, family dinners, 
dances, sports, games. Close-up interaction provides the full-spectrum sensorimotor 
training data one human needs to trust another.  
 
• Choose the right communications medium. Different media have different pros and 
cons. Email and text are excellent for transmitting concrete facts, but problematic for 
transmitting complex ideas, and horrible for transmitting emotions because they leave out 
cues our nervous systems need. High-bandwidth phone conversations are better for 
understanding and empathy, telepresence even better, with face-to-face the best of all. 
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